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Abstract in english
In Western Europe and the US, the last couple of decades have witnessed a large
increase in the new forms of marriages, usually called quasi-marriages, like cohabita-
tion. Today in many European countries more than 15% of all couples are cohabiting.
Furthermore, cohabiting couples di¤er from married ones. They tend to share house-
hold tasks and market works more equally than married couples. The aim of the rst
chapter of the dissertation, "Will You Quasi-Marry Me? The Rise of Cohabitation
and Decline of Marriages" is to account for the rise in cohabitation as well as the
cross-sectional di¤erences between cohabiting and married couples. To this end, a
two-period model of marriage and cohabitation with home production is built. Using
this framework, the relationship between the narrowing of the gender wage gap, the
improvement in household production technology and the agentsmarital decisions is
analyzed, both theoretically and empirically.
The second chapter of the dissertation, "Peer E¤ects in Young AdultsMarital
Decisions" studies peer group e¤ects on marital decisions using data from Waves I and
III of the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health). This data-
base contains detailed information on adolescentshigh school friends as well as their
marital behavior later in life. A balanced panel for the years 1995-2002 is constructed
using the calendar of all past and current relationships of the respondents. This pro-
cedure allows to recover the marital status of each individual and of her friends at any
given year in order to analyze how the marital transitions of individuals depend on
the marital status of their friends. The e¤ect of peers on marital decisions is identied
using panel data, instrumental variables techniques, and by exploiting the timing of
friendship formation. The results after controlling for various observable character-
istics of individuals and their friends show that peer e¤ects in marital decisions are
signicant. Robustness checks using former and placebo friends support the results,
and indicate that actual peers do matter.
The third chapter of the dissertation, "Young Adults living with their Parents
and the Inuence of peers" focuses on young adults living with their parents in the
U.S. and studies the role of peers. Using data from the National Longitudinal Study of
Adolescent Health (Add Health) the inuence of high school friends on the coresidence
of young adults with their parents is analyzed. The challenges in the identication of
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peer e¤ects in a static framework are addressed and are mitigated by employing an
instrumental variable technique and controlling for state xed e¤ects. The analysis
is then extended to a dynamic framework and exploits di¤erences in the timing of
leaving the parental home among peers. The results indicate that there are statistically
signicant peer e¤ects on the nest-leaving behavior of young adults.
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Resumen en castellano
En Europa Occidental y EE.UU., las últimas dos décadas han sido testigos de
un gran aumento de las nuevas formas de matrimonio, generalmente llamados cuasi-
matrimonios, como la cohabitación. Hoy en día, en muchos países de Europa, más del
15% de las parejas viven juntas sin casarse. Además, las parejas que deciden convivir
con y sin matrimonio dieren en sus características sociodemográcas. Las parejas
de hecho tienden a compartir las tareas de casa y el trabajo en el mercado en una
manera más equitativa que las parejas casadas. El objetivo del primo capítulo de la
tesis, "Will You Marry Me Quasi-Marry Me? The Rise of Cohabitation and Decline of
Marriages" es explicar el aumento de la convivencia fuera del matrimonio, así como las
diferencias entre convivientes y parejas casadas. Para este n, construyo un modelo
de dos periodos con matrimonio, convivencia y producción doméstica. Usando este
contexto, analizo la relación entre la reducción de la brecha salarial de género, la
mejora en la tecnología de producción de los hogares y las decisiones maritales de los
agentes, tanto teóricamente como empíricamente.
El segundo capítulo de la tesis, "Peer E¤ects in Young AdultsMarital Decisions"
estudia la inuencia de los amigos a las decisiones maritales usando el Estudio Nacional
Longitudinal de Salud Adolescente (Add Health). Esta base de datos contiene informa-
ción detallada sobre los amigos de la secundaria, así como su comportamiento marital
en el futuro. Construyo un panel para los años 1995-2002 utilizando el calendario de
todas las relaciones pasadas y presentes de los encuestados. Este procedimiento me
permite recuperar el estado civil de cada persona y de sus amigos en cualquier año
con el n de analizar cómo las transiciones maritales de personas dependen del estado
civil de sus amigos. El efecto de los amigos a las decisiones maritales se identica
utilizando el panel de datos, técnicas de variables instrumentales, y aprovechando el
momento de la formación de la amistad. Los resultados -controlando por diversas car-
acterísticas observables de los individuos y sus amigos- muestran que la inuencia de
los amigos a las decisiones maritales es signicativa. Pruebas de robustez con antiguos
amigos y amigos "placebo" apoyan los resultados, e indican que los amigos reales son
importantes.
El tercer capítulo de la tesis, "Young Adults Living with their Parents and the
Inuence of Peers " se centra en los adultos jóvenes que viven con sus padres en
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los EE.UU. y la inuencia de los amigos. Usando de nuevo los datos del Estudio
Longitudinal Nacional de la Salud de los Adolescentes (Add Health) analizo el efecto
de los amigos de la secundaria a la co-residencia de los adultos jóvenes con sus padres.
Los retos de la identicación de este tipo de efectos en contexto estático se mitigan
mediante el empleo de una técnica de variables instrumentales y controlando para
el estado de residencia de los encuestados. El análisis se extiende luego a un marco
dinámico y explota las diferencias en el momento de dejar la casa paterna entre amigos.
Los resultados indican que existen efectos signicativos de los amigos a la decisión de
los adultos jóvenes de abandonar la casa paterna.
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Chapter 1. Will You Quasi-marryMe? The Rise
of Cohabitation and Decline of Marriages
1.1 Introduction
Family and household structure changed drastically in the last couple of decades.
The marriage rate has declined sharply resulting in a shift in the composition of pop-
ulation by marital status towards never married. In the US the divorce rate has risen
substantially. It has also increased more recently in many European countries like
Italy, France, Germany, and Spain.
At the same period, the basic institution of marriage also underwent a big change.
People have turned to more exible forms of union. The decision to form a house-
hold with another person has been decoupled from the decision to marry, and quasi
marriages have emerged as a new institution. In some countries cohabiting couples
have the possibility to enter formal registration that will provide them with a virtu-
ally equivalent legal status to that of married couples (with some possible exceptions).
Some examples of more formal types of quasi marriage are registered partnership in
Belgium and pacte civile de solidarité in France. In most countries though, informal
cohabitation is the only available form of quasi marriage. Both formal and informal
cohabitation can be dissolved easily with minor costs and their dissolution rate is
higher than the divorce rate (see Pison, 2008 for pacte civile de solidarité in France
and Bumpass and Lu, 1989 and 2000 for informal cohabitation in the US).
But what factors are behind the shift towards quasi marriages? One possible factor
is the dramatic increase in female labor force participation over the past decades. The
increase started earlier in some countries (e.g. the US and the Nordic countries) but
spread to the most of the OECD countries. In 2001 the participation rates of prime-age
women range from less than 50% in many Southern European countries to well above
70% in Scandinavian, Central European countries, and the US (Jaumotte, 2003).
There is a large literature that studies the changes in female labor supply. Among
possible factors one can list the di¤usion of the contraceptive pill (Goldin and Katz,
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2002), the narrowing of the gender wage gap (Jones et al., 2003), the cultural trans-
mission of gender roles from mothers to sons (Fernández et al, 2004), and the improve-
ment in the household production technology (Greenwood et al., 2005). More recently,
Kaygusuz (2010) has emphasized the role of tax reforms, while Albanesi and Olivetti
(2009b) have proposed medical progress as a potential factor. In this paper we focus
on the narrowing of the gender wage gap and the improvement in the household pro-
duction technology. These two factors may also be related with the agentsincentives
to get married. The narrowing of the gender wage gap increases womens bargain-
ing power and reduces the value to specialization within marriage. Improvements in
household technology lead to a further decrease in the returns to specialization, and
in the opportunity cost of not getting married (Greenwood and Guner, 2009).
The question we try to investigate is the relationship between the narrowing of the
gender wage gap, the improvement in household production technology and the rise of
cohabitation. The basic idea is as follows: In the past, women did not always work for
pay, and their work was not always counted as work in the o¢ cial statistics. Moreover,
in the case they worked for pay, they used to earn less than men. Hence, marriage,
which was more di¢ cult to break than cohabitation due to the legal costs involved,
was an attractive option for women (Becker, 1993). Men on the other hand were
depending on women because of house work. Household production technology was
not very progressed and it required a lot of time. Hence, a man would get married to
a woman so as to use her time in house work and devote his own time to market work
(specialization). Nowadays the conditions have changed. The gender wage gap has
narrowed and household production technology has improved, weakening the incentives
to enter a "secure" union for both men and women.
Of course, the improvement in the household production technology has started
much earlier. One might expect that men would like to cohabit even then back in
time. However, this alone was not enough in order to give rise to cohabitation. It
is only when the gender wage gap started to narrow that women would consider a
cohabitation proposal. In other words, these two factors had to act simultaneously.
The idea that the agentsdecision about marriage is a¤ected by economic reasons
goes back to Becker (1993). According to Becker the major cause of the changes of the
family (decrease in marriages) was the growth in the earning power of women as the
American economy developed. Cohabitation is a more recent phenomenon and can be
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cosidered as a continuation of this change. Oppenheimer (1994) instead, argues that it
is the deterioration of young mens earnings that caused the increase in cohabitation.
The recent economic literature has proposed other possible causes of cohabitation.
Stevenson and Wolfers (2007) report as possible driving forces the diminishing social
stigma, and the lower value of formal marriage (through the unilateral divorce laws and
marriage tax penalty on secondary earners). Social stigma though, can be endogenous.
In this case, technological changes may as well a¤ect its evolution in time. Taxes could
play a role with the tax penalty acting as an enhancing factor for cohabitation. Chade
and Ventura (2005) develop a search model with di¤erential tax treatment of married
and single people in the US. They also extend their model to include cohabitation.
In their study cohabitors are taxed individually, as if they were single. However, it
is worth noticing that in Nordic countries and the US the tax penalty on secondary
earners has decreased during the last decades (Jaumotte, 2003). In the same period
in the US the rate of cohabitation has doubled. In Italy and Spain, where the tax
penalty has increased substantially, cohabiting couples are still a small minority (less
than 5%). Lastly, there are countries like France and the Netherlands where cohabiting
couples have the possibility of registering and therefore facing the same tax penalty as
married couples.
The existing literature takes di¤erent paths to model the di¤erences between mar-
riage and cohabitation. Drewianka (2004 and 2006) attributes the di¤erence in the
level of commitment, while Cigno (2007), Wydick (2007), and Matoushek and Rasul
(2008) adopt a game-theoretical framework where cohabitation arises as a non cooper-
ative equilibrium and marriage as a cooperative one. In Cignos (2007) framework, the
equilibrium in the cooperative game is reached by Nash-bargaining while equilibrium
in the non-cooperative game is Cournot-Nash and each party takes the other partys
actions as given. Matoushek and Rasul (2008) show that marriage serves as a com-
mitment device that fosters cooperation in an innitely repeated prisoners dilemma.
In our setting cohabitation di¤ers from marriage with respect to the probability and
the cost of dissolution.
The transition from cohabitation to marriage has also been a matter of interest.
Brien et al (2006) study cohabitation, marriage and divorce in the US using a model
of learning of match quality. They perform quantitative analysis and show that co-
habiting unions have higher dissolution probability than marriages and marriages that
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are proceeded by cohabitation are less likely to last (selection e¤ect). We treat co-
habitation as a substitute and not as a precursor to marriage, i.e. we abstract from
transitions into marriage.1 Moreover, the need to learn the match quality is unlikely
to explain why cohabitation has become common nowadays although it was rare in
the past. Gemici and Laufer (2010) study the ine¢ ciencies that might arise in co-
habitation due to the lack of commitment. Using a model with household production
technology they perform policy experiments, and assess the welfare implications of
di¤erent institutional arrangements regarding divorce regulations.
Fertility, and in particular, unwanted pregnancy might also a¤ect marital decisions.
Christensen (2010) shows that the contraceptive pill was a catalyst that increased
cohabitations role in selecting marriage partners, but did little in the short run to
promote cohabitation as a substitute for marriage. On the other hand, children might
be important when considering the transitions from cohabitation into marriage, which
is not the focus of this paper. We are interested in explaining why the formation
of cohabiting unions has become popular in the rst place, and we abstract from
subsequent fertility decisions, that would complicate the model without adding much
to the main objective of this paper.
There is also an empirical literature examining the factors that caused the increase
in cohabitation. Kalmjin (2007) uses cross-sectional data for 27 countries in the mid
1990s and nds that female labor force participation as well as the percentage of the
population with tertiary education a¤ects positively cohabitation. The unemployment
rate decreases cohabitation, while church membership does not have any statistically
signicant e¤ect. Wydick (2007) also nds that female labor force participation in-
creased cohabitation using data for the 50 states of the US in 1990 and 2000. In some
specications religion also seemed to play a signicant negative role. The divorce rate,
the mandated health insurance coverage of the contraception pill, as well as per capita
abortions do not have any signicant e¤ect.
Our variables of interest, i.e. the gender wage gap and the improvement of house-
1In the model we do not consider the transitions from cohabitation into marriage, i.e. we treat
cohabitation as a substitute and not as a precursor to marriage. This is because the main focus of
the paper is to show why more and more couples nowadays decide to cohabit in the rst place, while
this was not so common in the past. The transitions could be modeled by introducing match quality
in the model that evolves over time. The cohabiting couples whose match quality increases in the
2nd period get married and those whose match quality decreases separate. However, we expect that
the main results of the paper would remain una¤ected.
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hold production technology are two of the factors that have been identied behind the
increase in female employment. Greenwood et al (2005) study the e¤ect of the new
household production technology (through the declining prices and wider availability
of home appliances) on female labor force participation. This e¤ect is assessed empir-
ically by Cavalcanti and Tavares (2008) using data for 17 OECD countries between
the years 1975-1999. Their ndings suggest that a decrease in the relative price of
home appliances leads to a substantial and statistically signicant increase in female
labor force participation. Jones et al. (2003) nd instead that it is the gender wage
gap what drives the increase in female employment. The primer goal of these studies
is to examine the factors behind female employment and they therefore treat marital
decisions as exogenous without making any distinction between marriage and cohab-
itation. We endogenize the marital decision and we include cohabitation as an extra
marital institution.
1.2 Motivation
1.2.1 Cohabitation, marriage rate and marital status of the population
Cohabitation has risen sharply during the last decade. Cohabitants as a percent-
age of all couples have doubled in the US during the last 20 years (Current Population
Survey). The rate of cohabitation is nowadays around 20% or above in many Euro-
pean countries like Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden
(Table 1).
Cohabitation serves either as a precursor or as a substitute for marriage. In the US,
although most cohabitations do not end in marriage, most marriages are preceded by
cohabitation (National Survey of Family Growth, 2002). Furthermore, one fth of the
cohabitations in the US in 2002 last more than 5 years, indicating that cohabitation
can be permanent, and thus a substitute for marriage (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007a).
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Table 1
% change
Austria 1997 9.1 2007 15.4 68.5
Belgium* 2007 11.1 NA
Denmark 1996 24.8 2006 24.4 -1.8
Finland 1995 18.5 2007 24.2 30.8
France 1995 14.6 2004 19.6 34.5
Germany 1996 8.5 2005 11.7 37.4
Ireland 1995 4.7 2006 14.1 202.8
Italy 1995 3.1 2006 4.5 45.1
Netherlands 1996 13.9 2008 19.3 38.7
Norway 2008 22.4 NA
Spain 2005 4.3 NA
Sweden 1995 23.4 2005 26.8 14.9
UK 1996 10.0 2006 16.0 59.9
US 1996 5.1 2008 10.4 105.7
Definition: two persons of different sex that share the same house and identify themselves as a couple
(it excludes roommates, siblings etc)
Age group: All ages
Source: UNECE and National Statistical Services of each country
1990's 2000's
Cohabiting couples as percentage of all couples
At the same time, the marriage rate has decreased substantially in many countries
(Table 2). The crude marriage rate, i.e., the ratio of the number of marriages during
the year to the average population in that year, has fallen more than 17% in Austria,
France, Italy, the Netherlands, UK, and the US. Tables 1 and 2 indicate that more
couples decide to cohabit instead of getting married.
Table 2
Crude marriage rate (per 1000 inhabitants)
1990's 2000's
Austria 1995 5.4 2007 4.3
Belgium 1995 5.1 2007 4.3
Denmark 1995 6.6 2007 6.7
Finland 1995 4.7 2007 5.6
France 1995 9.1 2007 4.3
Germany 1995 5.3 2007 4.5
Ireland 1995 4.3 2007 5.2
Italy 1995 5.1 2007 4.2
Netherlands 1995 5.3 2007 4.3
Norway 1995 5.0 2007 5.0
Spain 1995 5.1 2007 4.5
Sweden 1995 3.8 2007 5.2
UK 1995 5.6 2007 4.4
US 1995 8.9 2007 7.3
Sources: National Vital Statistics (US) and Eurostat
Age group: All ages
The changes in the cohabitation and marriage rate are reected in the composition
of females by marital status (Table 3).2 The married female population have decreased
2The pattern is similar for men.
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in all countries, while the divorced and never married population have risen. Sweden
and France have experienced the biggest drop in the percentage of married population,
and nowadays more than half of the population is not married. In the US 10% of the
population is divorced. In Italy, on the other hand, although divorced people are still
a minority, they have doubled during the last decade.
Table 3
Country Marital Status 1993 2003 % Change
% married 56,4 54,0 -4,3
% never married 22,9 25,3 10,5
% divorced 9,6 10,9 13,5
% married 55,4 52,0 -6,1
% never married 22,7 26,0 14,5
% divorced 6,1 7,9 29,5
% married 51,3 46,5 -9,4
% never married 27,5 30,8 12,0
% divorced 5,6 7,5 33,9
% married 57,7 57,2 -0,9
% never married 26,4 26,2 -0,8
% divorced 1,0 1,7 70,0
% married 55,6 52,5 -5,6
% never married 27,1 28,9 6,6
% divorced 6,0 7,9 31,7
% married 46,7 41,7 -10,7
% never married 30,9 34,8 12,6
% divorced 9,8 12,2 24,5
Sources:
United States: U.S. Census Bureau
Marital Status of Female Population, 15 Years Old and Over
in Percentages
US
Germany
France
Italy
Netherlands
Sweden
Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, and Sweden: generated from Eurostat
Tables 1 to 3 show a downward trend in marriage that has been accompanied
by an upward trend towards unmarried cohabitation. The next step is to provide
cross-country evidence for the relationship between cohabitation, gender wage gap and
household production technology. This evidence will motivate the theoretical model
and the numerical exercise that follow.
1.2.2 Cross-country evidence
There are scarce data on cohabitation. In the case of the US an appropriate
estimate of cohabitation is available only after 1996. Before 1996 the estimates of
unmarried couples also included households that had two unmarried adults of the
opposite sex without identifying themselves as unmarried partners (Casper et al, 1999).
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) provides some data on
cohabitation but only for a few countries and years. We gathered our sample from the
National Statistical Services of each country as well as from UNECE. We constructed
14
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the rate of cohabitation as the number of cohabiting couples divided by the number
of all couples.
Surprisingly, data on the gender wage gap is also di¢ cult to nd. Most data on
wages are collected from rm surveys without making any distinction with respect to
the gender of the employees. We constructed the gender wage gap as the di¤erence of
average male and female earnings divided by average male earnings using data from
Eurostat, OECD and UNECE.
The relative price of home appliances is the price of home appliances as a ratio
of CPI. Data are available from Eurostat for all years after 1995. This variable has
been used in other studies (Cavalcanti and Tavares, 2008) as an indicator of household
production technology. Our complete dataset is an unbalanced panel for 15 OECD
countries in the period 1990-2008.
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Figure 1
In Figure 1 we plot the change in the gender wage gap and the change in the rate
of cohabitation during the last decade for a group of countries in our sample.3 All
data sources are explained in the Appendix. The gender wage gap is the di¤erence
between average earnings of male employees and of female employees as a percentage
of average earnings of male employees. The rate of cohabitation refers to cohabiting
3For the gures we consider only the countries for which there are available data for both variables
for a su¢ ciently long period. In particular, the periods covered are: Denmark: 1996-2005, Finland:
1995-2006, France: 1995-2005, Germany: 1996-2005, Ireland: 1995-2005, the Netherlands: 1996-2005,
Norway: 2001-2008, Sweden: 1995-2004, UK: 1997-2006, and the US: 1996-2007.
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couples as a percentage of all couples. Figure 1 indicates the existence of a negative
relationship between the two variables that is further explored below.
Next we focus on the possible relationship between the relative price of home
appliances and cohabitation. In Figure 2 we plot the change in the relative price of
home appliances and the change in the cohabitation rate during the last decade for
various countries.4The relative price of home appliances is measured as the ratio of
the price of home appliances over the consumer price index. We use 1996 as base
year. There is evidence of a negative relationship between the two variables, which is
examined below.
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Figure 2
Figures 1 and 2 indicate the existence of a negative relationship between the rate of
cohabitation and the gender wage gap as well as between the rate of cohabitation and
the relative price of home appliance. We investigate the relation between the cohabi-
tation rate on the one hand, and the gender wage gap and the relative price of home
appliances on the other hand, using panel data regressions below. Our specication is
4The countries and periods of reference are: Austria: 1997-2007, Denmark: 1996-2006, Fin-
land: 1996-2007, France: 1996-2005, Germany: 1996-2005, Ireland: 1995-2006, Italy: 1995-2006,
the Netherlands: 1996-2008, Norway: 2001-2008, Sweden: 1995-2005, UK: 1996-2007, and the US:
1998-2008.
16
1. Will You Quasi-Marry Me? The Rise of Cohabitation and Decline of Marriages
(cohabitation rate)it = + 0(gender wage gap)it
+1(relative price of home appliances)it
+2(other controls)it (1)
The vector of additional controls includes the annual percentage rate of GDP
growth and the percentage of urban population. GDP growth reects the degree
of development of each country and it is expected to a¤ect positively cohabitation.
People who live in urban areas have usually less traditional stereotypes about mar-
riage and are more open to changes than people in rural areas. This is why we expect
it to have a positive e¤ect on the rate of cohabitation. Summary statistics of the main
variables of interest are shown in Table 4.
Table 4. Summary Statistics
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Cohabitation 139 14.267 6.792 1.98 27.49
Gender wage gap 117 21.999 3.781 12.31 30.6
Relative price of home appliances 152 1.093 0.121 0.89 1.46
We rst check the correlations between the three variables of interest (Table 5).
There is a statistically signicant negative correlation between the rate of cohabitation
and the gender wage gap as well as between the rate of cohabitation and the price of
home appliances.
Table 5. Correlations
Cohabitation Gender wage gap
Gender wage gap -0.340***
Relative price of home appliances -0.286*** 0.429***
We then estimate the model by OLS without including additional controls, using
standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. The results are presented in Table 6a.
In all specications both the relative price of home appliances and the gender wage
gap have a negative and statistically signicant e¤ect as expected. Even when the
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two variables are introduced in isolation (specication 1) they explain a good share
in total variability in the rate of cohabitation. Their e¤ect is robust to the inclusion
of year dummies or time trend (specications 2 and 3). We then include country
dummies so as to capture country-specic di¤erences in the rate of cohabitation. The
coe¢ cients remain negative and signicant although they decrease in absolute value
(specications 4 and 5).5 This is in accordance with Figures 1 and 2 where we veried
that countries with the biggest change in the gender wage gap and the relative price
of home appliances experienced the biggest change in the rate of cohabitation.
Table 6a. Determinants of Cohabitation-Ratio of All Couples
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gender wage gap
-0.291**
(0.141)
-0.316**
(0.124)
-0.307**
(0.142)
-0.176**
(0.078)
-0.144**
(0.072)
Relative price of
home appliances
-18.49***
(4.947)
-60.81***
(6.424)
-62.84***
(6.492)
-9.00***
(1.443)
-5.34**
(2.403)
Year dummies No No Yes No Yes
Trend No Yes No No No
Country dummies No No No Yes Yes
N. of Observations 95 95 95 95 95
R2 0.17 0.40 0.42 0.99 0.99
All specications include a constant not reported. ** indicates signicant at the 95% condence level and *** at the 99%.
In the last specication the estimated elasticity for the average value of cohabitation
and the gender wage gap is -0.198, i.e. on average, if the gender wage gap narrows by
15% this will lead to an increase in cohabitation by 2.97%. The estimated elasticity for
the average value of cohabitation and the price of home appliances is almost double;
-0.37. This means that a 15% decrease in the relative price of home appliances leads
to an increase in cohabitation by 5.55%. The countries we study have experienced a
decrease around 15% both in the gender wage gap and in the relative price of home
appliances during the last decade. Germany, for instance, has experienced a 18.42%
decrease in the gender wage gap and a 17.36% decrease in the relative price of home
appliances. According to our estimates, such changes would imply an increase in the
5The results when the country dummies are included should be interpreted with caution due to
the high value of R2:
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rate of cohabitation of about 3.64% and 6.42% respectively. Given that the rate of
cohabitation in Germany increased by 35.56% from 1996 to 2005, the narrowing of
the gender wage gap accounts for about 10% of the increase, and the decline in the
relative price of home appliances for almost 20%.
We then included GDP growth and the percentage of urban population in all
specications but their coe¢ cients were not statistically signicant from zero. The
results with respect to the variables of interest were not a¤ected by the inclusion of
any extra regressor.
Interestingly, religiosity does not seem to play any role either. The World Values
Survey contains information on religiosity for various countries in 1990 and in 1999.
We use two alternative measures of religiosity; the percentage of people who attend
religious services more than once a week and the percentage of people who practically
never attend religious services.
In Figures 3 and 4 we plot the percentage change in religiosity and the percentage
change in cohabitation rate. There is no strong evidence of a relationship between the
two variables.
Figure 3
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Figure 4
Finally, if we measure cohabitation as a ratio of all households instead of all couples,
the gender wage gap loses its statistical signicance (Table 6b). This indicates that
the gender wage gap has an indirect e¤ect on cohabitation through a decrease in the
number of marriages.
Table 6b. Determinants of Cohabitation-Ratio of All Households
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gender wage gap
-0.073
(0.073)
-0.081
(0.071)
-0.077
(0.078)
-0.049
(0.036)
-0.048
(0.032)
Relative price of
home appliances
-7.69***
(2.684)
24.71***
(3.203)
-25.06***
(3.445)
-4.94***
(0.724)
-4.15***
(1.083)
Year dummies No No Yes No Yes
Trend No Yes No No No
Country dummies No No No Yes Yes
N. of Observations 95 95 95 95 95
R2 11.31 28.61 0.31 0.99 0.99
All specications include a constant not reported. ** indicates signicant at the 95% condence level and *** at the 99%.
Before moving to the theoretical model though, it is important to see whether
cohabitation is more common among specic groups of the population with respect
to some characteristics (education, wealth, and employment status). The theoretical
model that we develop is going to deliver these cross-sectional facts while accounting for
the changes in cohabitation, gender wage gap, and household production technology.
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1.2.3 Cross-sectional facts
Cohabiting and married couples di¤er along many dimensions. Cohabitation in
the US is more common among poor and less educated partners (Bumpass and Sweet,
1989). This pattern is still observed in more recent data according to the report of Vital
and Health Statistics (2010). Similar patterns are observed also in UK (Goodman and
Greaves, 2010). Table 7 shows the percent distribution of women aged 15-44 in the US
according to education and poverty characteristics. Married women seem to be more
educated and richer than the cohabiting ones. There is a similar pattern also for men.
Furthermore married couples in the US are less alike with respect to hours worked
and earnings when compared to cohabiting ones (Brines and Joyner, 1999 and Jepsen
and Jepsen, 2002). Table 8 shows the percentage of cohabiting and married women,
who report being a housewife as their main occupation. We use data from the 2002
International Social Survey Program (ISSP) on Family and Changing Gender Roles as
it contains information on the relationship and occupational status of the respondents
and of their partners.
Table 7
Percent distribution of women aged 15-44 by current marital or cohabiting status in the US
Characteristic Married Cohabiting
Total 46.0 9.1
Education*
No high school diploma or GED 49.1 17.2
High school diploma or GED 56.7 11.3
Some college, no bachelor's degree 57.4 7.6
Bachelor's degree or higher 62.9 5.4
Percent of poverty level*
0-149% 40.9 13.0
  0-99% 39.1 13.1
150-299% 60.4 9.9
300% or higher 66.5 6.4
Source: Vital and Health Statistics, Series 23, No. 28, February 2010 based on NSFG 2002 data
The percent of poverty level is based on the 2001 poverty levels defined by the U.S. Census Bureau
*Limited to women aged 22-44
Percent distribution
In all countries except for Denmark the percentage of housewives is higher among
married than among cohabiting women.6 The traditional "woman at home-man in the
market" pattern is more common among married couples. Cohabitation seems to be
more symmetric, in the sense that both spouses work.
6The ISSP contains information on the occupation of both the respondent and the spouse/partner
but information on age is limited to the respondent. This prohibits us from controlling for age since
half of the observations are refered to the spouse/partner. Hence, a part of the di¤erence in percentage
of housewifes among cohabitors and married can be attributed to the older age of married women.
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Table 8
Percentage of housewives
Cohabiting women Married women
Austria 11.89 26.36
Denmark 2.76 2.73
Finland 4.24 4.46
France 4.92 16.38
Germany 2.77 17.40
Ireland 9.52 39.07
Netherlands 10.53 32.19
Norway 6.62 7.37
Spain 15.71 49.60
Sweden 0.00 1.13
UK 14.79 16.90
US 15.56 26.25
Source: ISSP 2002 (own calculations)
Age group: all ages
In order to highlight the role of the gender wage gap and the price of home ap-
pliances in the rise of cohabitation, in the next section we build a model that can
account for the changes in cohabitation and deliver the cross sectional facts that we
have just discussed. This model will allow us to examine how the agentsdecision to
get married, cohabit or stay single are related with the narrowing of the gender wage
gap and the improvement in the household production technology. These two factors
will act through the female labor supply channel. Female labor supply will also be
the key determinant of the cross sectional di¤erences among married and cohabiting
couples.
1.3 A Two-period Model
Consider the following model of marriage, cohabitation and divorce. Agents live
for two periods. They are heterogeneous with respect to wages. Both men and women
can work in the labor market but women are o¤ered lower wages due to the gender
wage gap. They derive utility from a market good and a good produced at home using
durables and house work as inputs. In the 1st period they meet in pairs in the marriage
market and the man may propose marriage or cohabitation to the woman through
a take-it or leave-it o¤er. In the 2nd period couples face a probability of divorce.
Cohabitation di¤ers from marriage in terms of probability and cost of dissolution.
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There is a continuum of males (m) and females (f), each of measure one. Agents
discount time in rate 0 <  < 1: Each agent has 1 unit of time and derives no utility
from leisure. The utility function is additively separable of the form
U(c; h) =  ln(c) + (1  ) ln(h);
where c is a market good and h a good produced at home.
There is a labor market where both men and women can work. There is hetero-
geneity in wages among men and among women. Mens wages wm are drawn from
a distribution Fwm with support [w;w] : Womens wages are drawn from a distribu-
tion Fwf with support [w; w] and  2 (0; 1) i.e. there is a gender wage gap. This
di¤erence in wages is exogenous7. There is a household production technology that
transforms work at home into home produced goods h according to
h = A [d + (1  )(1  l)]1= ; 0 <  < 1;
where d is the stock of household durables which are purchased in price q, l is labor
supplied to the market (hence, 1  l is the time devoted to household production), A is
technological progress and  determines the elasticity of substitution between durables
and house work ( 1
1 ). We assume that durables purchased in the 1st period depreciate
fully by the beginning of the 2nd period. Married/cohabiting men devote all of their
available time to market work, while married/cohabiting women distribute their time
between market work lf and house work (1  lf ).8
There is also a marriage market where single people meet randomly potential part-
ners of the opposite sex (who are also single). In the 1st period people meet in pairs.
Upon meeting, the man makes take-it or leave-it o¤ers to the woman.9 Each o¤er
consists of a sextuple
 
ci1f ; l
i
1f ; d
i
1; c
i
2f ; l
i
2f ; d
i
2

where i is the type of marital institution,
i.e. marriage or cohabitation. The o¤er will be a function of (wm; wf ). Cohabitation
di¤ers from marriage with respect to the divorce cost. The divorce cost entailed with
7A possible extention is to endogenize the gender wage gap through the work experience channel
(a form of human capital accumulation). See among others Albanesi and Olivetti (2009a), and Erosa
et al. (2010).
8We relax this assumption by assuming that the man supplies a xed amount of time to household
production. For a reasonable amount (less than 20%) we get a very similar pattern of marital outcomes
(See Appendix).
9This assumption is not critical. In the Appendix we analyze the case that the woman makes the
take-it or leave-it o¤er to the man and the results are una¤ected.
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marriage ( > 0) is higher than the one entailed with cohabitation due to the law.
We normalize the separation cost of cohabitors to zero. The woman can either accept
the o¤er and enter into a union with the man, or reject the o¤er and remain single.
The reason why agents would prefer entering a marital institution to singlehood is
specialization. The woman will work at home in order to produce the household good
and the man in the market where he earns more than the woman.
We assume that the good produced at home is a shared good for the couple with
sharing parameter  2 1
2
; 1

. Hence, if the amount of the household good produced
is h, each partner will consume h: As  ! 1 there are economies of scale in the
consumption of the household good. This is because the needs of a household grow
with each additional member but not in a proportional way. Needs for housing space,
electricity, etc will not be twice as high for a household with two members than for a
single person.
In the 2nd period the agents who matched in the 1st period and have entered
a union (marriage or cohabitation) face an exogenous probability of divorce m or
separation c respectively, with 0  m  1, 0  c  1, and m < c:10 We assume
that divorced/separated agents do not rematch in the 2nd period. Agents who are
single in the beginning of the 2nd period did not match in the 1st period waiting for a
di¤erent match (in terms of wages). In the 2nd period single agents meet again in the
marriage market. Upon meeting single men/women make/receive take-it or leave-it
o¤ers just like in the 1st period.11
Single agents problem. Below we dene and characterize the utility maximiza-
tion problem of single and divorced agents and the optimal marriage/cohabitation
proposal.12 In the analysis that follows we set  equal to 0; i.e. we use a Cobb-Douglas
production function in order to get analytical results. The problem of a single agent
in the current period (1st or 2nd) is
10There is empirical evidence that cohabitations are more unstable than marriage (Bumpass and
Sweet, 1989, and Bumpass and Lu, 2000). Alternatively we could endogenize the divorce decision by
assuming that agents derive utility from a match quality that evolves over time. Also in this case
cohabitation will be more unstable than marriage, since the couples that decide to cohabit will be
the ones with low match quality (See Brien at el, 2006).
11Since there are only 2 periods the o¤er in the 2nd (last) period will be a triple (cif ; l
i
f ; d
i
f ).
12First order conditions can be obtained by the author upon request.
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U(csg(wg); h
s
g(wg)) = max
csg>0;h
s
g>0;0<l
s
g1;dsg>0
 ln(csg) + (1  ) ln(hsg)
subject to
csg = wgl
s
g   qdsg;
and
hsg = A(d
s
g)
(1  lsg);1 
where g = m; f stands for male and female.
Combining the rst order conditions, and the constraints we get
dsg = (1  )
wg
q
; (2)
lsg = + (1  ); (3)
hsg = A((1  )
wg
q
)((1  )(1  ));1  (4)
and
csg = wg: (5)
Working hours are constant. Thus, improvements in household technology do not
alter the amount of labour supplied by single agents. This is simply due to the Cobb-
Douglas assumption, and with  6= 0, improvements in household technology do a¤ect
working hours. The womans reservation utility in the second period is then
U sf (wf ) =  ln(wf ) + (1  ) ln(A((1  )
wf
q
)((1  )(1  ))1 ): (6)
The womans reservation utility increases as her wage goes up or as the price of
durables goes down. This is because the higher wage allows the single woman to buy
more durables (remember that the labor supply is constant) and therefore to produce
more household good. Lowering the price of durables has the same e¤ect.
Divorced agents problem. The problem that a divorced agent faces in the 2nd
period depends on the divorce cost  and is given by
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Udg (wg) = max
cdg>0;h
d
g>0;0<l
d
g1;ddg>0
 ln(cdg) + (1  ) ln(hdg) (7)
subject to
cdg = wgl
d
g   qddg   ;
and
hdg = A(d
d
g)
(1  ldg)1 ;
where g = m; f stands for male and female.
The rst order conditions are
ddg = (1  )
(wg   )
q
; (8)
ldg = + (1  ) +
(1  )(1  )
wg
; (9)
hdg = A((1  )
(wg   )
q
)((1  )(1  )(1  
wg
));1  (10)
and
cdg = (wg   ): (11)
The rst order conditions are similar to the ones of the problem of a single man.
The di¤erence lies on the budget constraint, and in particular on the cost of divorce.
The divorce cost decreases the quantity of the durable good and the quantity of the
consumption good. Moreover, the labor supply is not constant as in the case of singles,
but it depends negatively on the wage due to the xed cost of divorce. More specically,
if the wage goes down the divorced agent will have to work more hours in order to
cover the divorce cost.
Hence, the utility of a divorced agent is
Udg (wg) =  ln((wg ))+(1 ) ln(A((1 )
(wg   )
q
)((1 )(1 )(1  
wg
))1 );
(12)
where g = m; f stands for male and female.
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There are also women who chose to remain single in the 1st period, waiting for
a better match in the 2nd period. Let us dene the expected utility that a woman
will derive in the 2nd period, who was single in the 1st period by V 2f (wf ): She can
either remain single in the 2nd period or enter a union (cohabitation or marriage).
Her decision depends on the probability of meeting a man willing and able to make
an acceptable proposal. Let rc =
R
wm2W c dF (wm) be the fraction of men who can
propose cohabitation and rm =
R
wm2Wm dF (wm) be the fraction of men who can
propose marriage. Then,
V 2f (wf ) = (1  rc   rm)U sf (wf ) +
Z
wm2W c
( ln(ccf ) + (1  ) ln(hc))dF (wm)
+
Z
wm2Wm
( ln(cmf ) + (1  ) ln(hm))dF (wm)
= (1  rc   rm)U sf (wf ) + Erc( ln(ccf ) + (1  ) ln(hc))
+ Erm( ln(c
m
f ) + (1  ) ln(hm))
= (1  rc   rm)U sf (wf ) + rcV 2;cf (wf ) + rmV 2;mf (wf ); 8 wm; (13)
where the last equality follows from the fact that no man can inuence rc; Erc; rm; Erm ;
U sf (wf ) and hence each woman of type wf has a xed reservation value for accepting a
take-it or leave-it o¤er independently from the mans type wm: The functions V
2;c
f (wf )
and V 2;mf (wf ) are the utility that a woman, who was single in the 1st period, will
derive in the 2nd period from cohabitation and marriage, respectively.
Since there is no possibility of divorce after the 2nd period the utility derived
from marriage or cohabitation is the same for all men and for all women. Hence,
V 2;mf (wf ) = V
2;c
f (wf ), i.e. women are indi¤erent between cohabitation and marriage.
The only thing that matters for a woman is whether she receives a proposal or not.
Let r = rm + rc: Then (13) becomes
V 2f (wf ) = (1  r)U sf (wf ) + rV 2;mf (wf )
= (1  r)U sf (wf ) + r(ln(cmf (wf )) + (1  ) ln(hm(wf )));8wm:
(13a)
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Optimal marriage proposal in the 2nd period. Now let us dene the problem
of a man who wants to propose marriage/ cohabitation to a woman in the 2nd pe-
riod given that the woman will accept the proposal (participation constraint). The
problem consists of nding the triple
 
cmf ; l
m
f ; d
m

that maximizes his utility given the
budget constraint (BC), the household production technology (HPT), the womans
participation constraint (WPC), and the utility of the woman when single. It is given
by
max
cmf >0;0<l
m
f 1;dm>0
 ln(cmm) + (1  ) ln(hm) (14)
subject to
cmm + c
m
f = wm + wf l
m
f   qdm; (BC)
hm = A(dm)(1  lmf )1 ; (HPT)
and
U sf (wf )   ln(cmf ) + (1  ) ln(hm); (WPC)
where U sf (wf ) is given by (6).
Combining the rst order conditions and the constraints,13 we get
dm =
(1  )(wf + wm)
q
; (15)
lmf = (+ (1  ))  (1  )(1  )
wm
wf
; (16)
and
hm = A(
(1  )(wf + wm)
q
)((1  )(1  )(1 + wm
wf
)):1  (17)
Given the Cobb-Douglas assumption, the labor supply of a married/cohabiting
woman does not depend on A and q. Hence, improvements in the household production
technology only increase the quantity of purchased durables and therefore the quantity
of the home good produced. However, in contrast to the case of singles, the labor
supply of the married/cohabiting woman depends on both her own wage (positively)
13See the Appendix for the derivations of the rst order conditions. Corner solutions can be
obtained by the author upon request.
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and on the wage of her spouse (negatively). Hence, changes in the gender wage gap
will have an impact on female labor supply.
TheWPCwill always bind, since the man has all the bargaining power. Hence, even
if the woman accepts the proposal in the 2nd period her utility will not alter (it will
exactly match her reservation utility U sf (wf ) in singlehood). The man, however, can
be better o¤ if the woman accepts the proposal, thanks to specialization. Therefore,
U sf (wf ) =  ln(c
m
f ) + (1  ) ln(hm):
Then,
cmf = exp

1

U sf (wf ) 
(1  )

ln(hm)

; (18)
where U sf (wf ) and h
m are given by (6) and (17) respectively. Then (13a) becomes
V 2f (wf ) = (1  r)U sf (wf ) + rV 2;mf (wf )
= (1  r)U sf (wf ) + rU sf (wf ) = U sf (wf ) (19)
=  ln(wf ) + (1  ) ln(A((1  )wf
q
)((1  )(1  ))1 ):
Although the utility that the woman will derive in a union will be the same as
the utility that she derives in singlehood, the allocation will di¤er, i.e. csf 6= cmf and
hsf 6= hm: In particular, using (4), (5), (17) and (18), we get
 ln cmf    ln csf = (1  ) [lnwf   ln(wf + wm)  ln ] < 0 (20)
and
(1  ) ln hmf   (1  ) lnhsf = (1  ) [ln(wf + wm)  lnwf + ln ] > 0; (21)
8 2
h
wf
wf+wm
; 1
i
; i.e. a woman who decides to get married or cohabit in the 2nd period
will consume less consumption good but more household good than if she had stayed
single. The increase in the household good exactly compensates for the decrease in
the consumption good.
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Optimal marital status in the 2nd period. Is it possible that marriage/cohabitation
will not be feasible in the 2nd period? It may be the case that a man is better o¤
single, so he will not be willing to propose to the woman. It may also be the case
that the man is not able to propose because his budget is not enough so as to satisfy
the womans participation constraint, and make her accept his proposal. Both cases
depend on the combination of wf and wm: Formally, marriage/cohabitation in the 2nd
period is not feasible if the man is better o¤ single, i.e.
U sm(wm) >  ln(c
m
m) + (1  ) ln(hm);
or if he cannot satisfy the WPC, i.e. both
U sf (wf ) =  ln(c
m
f ) + (1  ) ln(hm);
and
cmm + c
m
f  wm + wf lmf   qdm
cannot hold simultaneously with
cmm > 0; c
m
f > 0; 0  lmf < 1; dm > 0; hm > 0:
Optimal marriage proposal in the 1st period. Now let us focus on the optimal
marriage proposal in the 1st period. A man who wants to propose marriage to a woman
in the 1st period has also to consider the probability and the cost of divorce. His o¤er is
renegotiation-proof; even if we allow for renegotiation, the man will have no incentive
to change his o¤er in the 2nd period because the womans participation constraint will
always bind. The problem consists of nding the vector
 
c1;mf ; l
1;m
f ; d
1;m; c2;mf ; l
2;m
f ; d
2;m

that maximizes his utility given the budget constraint in each period (BC1) and (BC2),
the household production technology in each period (HPT1) and (HPT2), the womans
participation constraint in each period (WPC1) and (WPC2), as well as his utility if
divorced, the utility of the woman when single, and the utility of the woman if divorced
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max
c1;mf >0;0<l
1;m
f <1;d
1;m>0;c2;mf >0;0<l
2;m
f <1;d
2;m>0;
 ln(c1;mm ) + (1  ) ln(h1;m)
+ 

(1  m)   ln(c2;mm ) + (1  ) ln(h2;m)+ mUdm(wm)
subject to
c1;mm + c
1;m
f = wm + wf l
1;m
f   qd1;m; (BC1)
c2;mm + c
2;m
f = wm + wf l
2;m
f   qd2;m; (BC2)
h1;m = A(d1;m)(1  l1;mf )1 ; (HPT1)
h2;m = A(d2;m)(1  l2;mf )1 ; (HPT2)
(1 + )U sf (wf )   ln(c1;mf ) + (1  ) ln(h1;m)
+[(1  m) ( ln(c2;mf ) + (1  ) ln(h2;m)) + mUdf (wf )];
(WPC1)
and
U sf (wf )   ln(c2;mf ) + (1  ) ln(h2;m); (WPC2)
where U sf (wf ) is given by (6), and U
d
m(wm) and U
d
f (wf ) are given by (12).
Combining the rst order conditions and the constraints we nd that
d1;m = d2;m;
and
l1;mf = l
2;m
f ;
and therefore
h1;m = h2;m:
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Thus, the mans take-it or leave-it o¤er to the woman will entail the same amount
of durables, hours of market work, and therefore hours of housework and household
good as the ones we found when we characterized the 2nd period (15)-(17). Moreover,
the consumption good he o¤ers to the woman in the 2nd period (c2;mf ) will again be
given by (18) since the womans participation constraint in the 2nd period (WPC2) is
the same.
The di¤erence lies on the amount of consumption good o¤ered in the 1st period
(c1;mf ). The man will have to o¤er as much c
1;m
f as it is necessary so as to satisfy the
womans participation constraint in the 1st period (WPC1). However, the womans
participation constraint in the 1st period di¤ers from the one in the 2nd period because
of the dissolution probability and its resulting cost. Again, the man will exactly match
the womans reservation utility because he has all the bargaining power
(1 + )U sf (wf ) =  ln(c
1;m
f ) + (1  ) ln(h1;m)
+ [(1  m) ( ln(c2;mf ) + (1  ) ln(h2;m)) + mUdf (wf )]:
Taking into account that the womans participation constraint will bind also in the
2nd period we get
(1 + )U sf (wf ) =  ln(c
1;m
f ) + (1  ) ln(h1m) + [(1  m)U sf (wf ) + mUdf (wf )];
and therefore
c1;mf = exp

1

 
U sf (wf )  (1  ) ln(hm1 ) + m(U sf (wf )  Udf (wf ))

: (22)
Equation (22) completes the characterization of the optimal marriage proposal.
The next step is to characterize the optimal cohabitation proposal. Only then the
man will be able to determine his optimal marital status.
Optimal cohabitation proposal. The problem of the optimal cohabitation pro-
posal in the 1st period is the same as the one of the optimal marriage proposal, but
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without any divorce cost ( = 0) and with higher dissolution probability c > m.
Hence, in both periods, the man will o¤er to the woman the same amount of
durables (dc), hours of market work (lcf), and therefore hours of housework (1   lcf)
and household good (hc) as the ones of the marriage proposal (15)-(17). The amount
of consumption good o¤ered in the 2nd period (c2;cf ) will be given by (18).
What about the amount of consumption good in the 1st period (c1;cf )? The man
will have to o¤er as much c1;cf as it is necessary so as to exactly match the womans
reservation utility. However, the womans participation constraint di¤ers from the one
in marriage in terms of dissolution probability and cost.
(1 + )U sf (wf ) =  ln(c
1;c
f ) + (1  ) ln(h1;c)
+ [(1  c) ( ln(c2;cf ) + (1  ) ln(h2;c)) + cU sf (wf )];
which can be written as
(1 + )U sf (wf ) =  ln(c
1;c
f ) + (1  ) ln(h1c) + [(1  c)U sf (wf ) + cU sf (wf )]:
This simplies into
U sf (wf ) =  ln(c
1;c
f ) + (1  ) ln(h1;c);
from which we get
c1;cf = exp

1

(U sf (wf )  (1  ) ln(h1;m))

= c2;cf : (23)
Hence, if the man wants to propose cohabitation to the woman in the 1st period he
has to make the same o¤er as in the 2nd period. Contrary to the marriage o¤er, the
man will o¤er the same amount of consumption good to the woman in both periods.
This is because in the case of cohabitation there is no dissolution cost. If there was no
divorce cost in the case of marriage, equations (22) and (23) would be equal, and as
a result, the proposal of marriage would be identical to the proposal of cohabitation.
With positive divorce cost though, U sf (wf ) > U
d
f (wf ) in (22) which yields c
1;m
f > c
1;c
f ,
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i.e. the man has to o¤er more consumption good to the woman in marriage than in
cohabitation (in this way the man compensates the woman for possible divorce costs).
Optimal marital status in the 1st period. In order to determine the optimal
marital status the man has to compare his utility in singlehood to his utility in co-
habitation and to his utility in marriage. In the two latter cases he should be able
to satisfy the womans participation constraint or else singlehood is the only possible
option. Singlehood is optimal if the man is better o¤ single, i.e.
(1 + )U sm(wm) >  ln(c
1;m
m ) + (1  ) ln(h1;m)
+[(1  m) ( ln(c2;mm ) + (1  ) ln(h2;m)) + mUdm(wm)];
and
(1 + )U sm(wm) >  ln(c
1;c
m ) + (1  ) ln(h1;c)
+[(1  c) ( ln(c2;cm ) + (1  ) ln(h2;c)) + cU cm(wm)];
or if he cannot satisfy the WPC in marriage and cohabitation in any of the two periods,
i.e.
ct;mm + c
t;m
f  wm + wf lt;mf   qdt;m
cannot hold simultaneously with
ct;mm > 0; c
t;m
f > 0; 0  lt;mf < 1; dt;m > 0; ht;m > 0
for some t = 1; 2 and
ct;cm + c
t;c
f  wm + wf lt;cf   qdt;c
cannot hold simultaneously with
ct;cm > 0; c
t;c
f > 0; 0  lt;cf < 1; dt;c > 0; ht;c > 0
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for some t = 1; 2:
Marriage is optimal if the man is better o¤ married, i.e. his discounted utility in
marriage for both periods is higher than his discounted utility in singlehood and his
discounted utility in cohabitation. Similarly for cohabitation.
Up to now we have set up and solved a model of marriage and cohabitation, whose
main ingredients are the gender wage gap and the household production. We showed
that the man will propose marriage or cohabitation to a woman in order to maximize
his utility. In the case that the womans reservation utility is too high, matching
may not be feasible. The outcome will depend on the combination of wages of each
prospective couple (wm; wf ). In the following section we examine marital outcomes
for di¤erent combinations of male and female wages.
1.4 Numerical Example
As it became clear from the theoretical model, the optimal marital status of the
agents depends on the combination of wages of the prospective couple. In other words,
when a man meets a woman, he will either propose marriage or cohabitation to her, or
he will prefer to stay single, or he will not even be able to propose. The outcome will
depend on the combination of their wages. In order to get a better understanding of
the mechanics of the model we solve a numerical example using the parameter values
in Table 9.
We have not picked these values so as to match any data, i.e. we do not calibrate
the model. Still, we have chosen them in a way that gives predictions close to the
data estimates. Such a simple model can actually deliver the cross-sectional facts that
are observed in the data and accounts for the rise in cohabitation. Our benchmark
is the US economy in 2008. The value of the discount rate  = 0:96 is standard
in the literature. We assume that the agents value the consumption good as much
as the household good and we set their weights equal, i.e.  = 0:5: We set  =
1:7 following the equivalence scale proposed by OECD (1 for the rst member of
the household, 0.7 for the second). The probability of dissolution in cohabitation
is set almost double than the probability of divorce in marriage. In particular, we
set the probability of divorce for married couples m = 0:30 following Stevenson and
Wolfers (2007b). For cohabiting couples we set the probability of dissolution c = 0:50;
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according to the report of Vital and Health Statistics (2010) about half of cohabiting
unions do not survive after 1 year of cohabitation. Setting A = 20 in the household
production function and q = 2 for the price of durables gives an average share of
expenditure on durables over labor income equal to 21% which is in accordance with
recent estimates (Baxter and Rotz, 2009). The divorce cost  is set equal to 3.5
in order the percentage of married population to be 55%, i.e. close to its value in
2008 (Source: http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2008/tabA1-
all.xls). We start with a gender wage gap  = 78% and we then examine the e¤ect of
decreasing it to 70% of mens wage, i.e. its value in the beginning of the 1990s (Source:
http://www.iwpr.org/pdf/C350.pdf).14 The lowest wage is normalized to 10, and it is
assumed that wages are uniformly distributed between 10 and 100 with increments of
10.
Table 9
Parameters Values
Preferences


0:5
0:96
Public good parameter  1=1:7
Household production technology
A


q
20
0:19
0:2
2! 5
Wages
w

[10; 20; :::; 100]
0:78! 0:70
Dissolution
m
c

0:30
0:50
3:5
In the literature improvements of household production technology have been mod-
eled as a reduction in the price of home appliances (e.g. Greenwood et al., 2005). We
set  = 0:19 and  = 0:2; values estimated by McGrattan, Rogerson and Wright
(1997). Regarding the change of the price of home appliances, the available data for
14In the model the gender wage gap is captured by the parameter  , which expresses womens wage
as percentage of mens wage. Hence, the lower  , the wider the gender wage gap.
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the US cover only the period between 1998-2008, during which the decline was 32%
(US Bureau of Labor Statistics). We assume a moderate decline of similar magnitude
for the years between 1990-1998 and we set the price in 1990 equal to 5, i.e. a 60%
increase with respect to the price in 2008, which was 2.
1.4.1 The e¤ect of the gender wage gap
First we examine the e¤ects of the narrowing of the gender wage gap on womens
market labor supply and on all agentsmarital decisions. Recall that the agents live
only for 2 periods. Therefore, in the last (2nd) period there is no di¤erence between
marriage and cohabitation as dissolution is not possible any more. This is why we will
focus only on the 1st period.
The e¤ect of the gender wage gap on agents marital status is shown in Figure 4.
When gender gap in pay is narrow, more agents choose to stay single or cohabit. As
a result, the number of cohabiting agents as a percentage of all matched agents goes
up, reducing the percentage of married population.
Optimal marital status with narrow gender wage gap (2008)
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Optimal marital status with wide gender wage gap (1990)
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Figure 4
This e¤ect is driven by changes in the market labor supply of the females. The nar-
rowing of the gender wage gap makes women work more in the market, improving their
outside option (singlehood). It is then more costly for a man to satisfy the womans
participation constraint and convince her to match with him. Moreover, the returns
to specialization decrease, weakening the incentives to get married. Marriage implies
higher cost and lower probability of dissolution than cohabitation. In the absence of
substantial returns to specialization, cohabitation is favored against marriage.
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Table 10
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.07 0.14 0.20
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.13 0.19 0.25
0 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.11 0.19 0.24 0.29
0 0 0 0 0 0.09 0.18 0.24 0.29 0.33
0 0 0 0 0.07 0.17 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.38
0 0 0 0.03 0.16 0.25 0.31 0.36 0.40 0.42
0 0 0 0.15 0.26 0.33 0.38 0.42 0.65 0.65
0 0 0.14 0.27 0.35 0.40 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.65
0 0.12 0.30 0.39 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.65
0.09 0.37 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.65
with narrow gender wage gap (2008)
Female market labor supply by marital status
woman's wage
m
an
's
 w
ag
e
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.08 0.14
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.07 0.14 0.19
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.13 0.19 0.24
0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0.12 0.19 0.25 0.29
0 0 0 0 0 0.11 0.20 0.26 0.31 0.34
0 0 0 0 0.10 0.20 0.27 0.32 0.36 0.39
0 0 0 0 0.21 0.29 0.34 0.39 0.42 0.65
0 0 0.08 0.22 0.31 0.37 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.65
0 0.06 0.26 0.36 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.65
0.02 0.33 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.65
Female market labor supply by marital status
woman's wage
m
an
's
 w
ag
e
with wide gender wage gap (1990)
Table 10 depicts the e¤ect of the gender wage gap on female market labor supply.
In the benchmark economy (left panel) the model predicts that 64% of women will
participate in the market. This value is in accordance with recent statistics (US Bureau
of Labor Statistics). First, the labor supply of single women remains fairly constant,15
i.e. it is almost una¤ected by the narrowing of the gender wage gap.16 By contrast,
the labor supply of all married and cohabiting women increases substantially after
the narrowing of the gender wage gap. In the intensive margin, single women work
more than both married and cohabiting women. Furthermore, a cohabiting woman
will work more hours in the market than a married woman at the same wage rate.
A more interesting implication of the model has to do with the extensive margin
of female labor force participation. There are many married women who are fully
specialized in home production, while almost all cohabiting women do work in the
market. Moreover, cohabiting couples are composed by partners with similar wages.
Assortative matching is more prevalent in cohabitation than marriage. This is in ac-
cordance with the study of Brines and Joyner (1999) who show that economic equality
is a key element of a long term cohabiting relationship and specialization for marriage.
1.4.2 The e¤ect of the price of home appliances
We examine the e¤ect of improvements in the household production technology
through a decrease in the price of home appliances. The results are shown in Figure
15The model predicts that single women devote around 65% of their time to market labor. This
number is reasonable, given the models assumption that there is no leisure.
16This is in accordance with the data, see Jones et al (2003)
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5. When home appliances are cheaper all men and women are better o¤ because
they can substitute house work with durables. However, some couples who would get
married when home appliances were expensive, prefer to cohabit after the decline in
prices. For these couples the benets of marriage (specialization and returns to scale)
are not enough so as to compensate the man for the cost of a possible divorce. On
the one hand cohabitation can be dissolved without any cost. On the other hand
cohabitation has a higher probability of dissolution. However, a possible dissolution
can be accommodated more easily after the decrease in price of home appliances.
Hence, these couples decide to cohabit instead of getting married.
There are also singles who decide to cohabit after the decline in price of home
appliances in order to benet from the increasing returns to scale in the household
good. All in all, the rate of cohabitation increases and the percentage of unmarried
population (cohabiting and singles) goes up.
Optimal marital status with low price of home appliances (2008)
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Optimal marital status with high price of home appliances (1990)
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Figure 5
Similarly to the narrowing of the gender wage gap, the decrease in the price of
home appliances also leads to an increase in female market labor supply (Table 11).
Cheaper home appliances act as an "engine of liberation" for women allowing them
to spend more time in the labor market (See Greenwood et al, 2005). The increase
in female market hours is larger for married and cohabiting women than for single
women.
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Table 11
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.07 0.14 0.20
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.13 0.19 0.25
0 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.11 0.19 0.24 0.29
0 0 0 0 0 0.09 0.18 0.24 0.29 0.33
0 0 0 0 0.07 0.17 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.38
0 0 0 0.03 0.16 0.25 0.31 0.36 0.40 0.42
0 0 0 0.15 0.26 0.33 0.38 0.42 0.65 0.65
0 0 0.14 0.27 0.35 0.40 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.65
0 0.12 0.30 0.39 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.65
0.09 0.37 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.65
m
an
's
 w
ag
e
woman's wage
Female market labor supply by marital status
with low price of home appliances (2008)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.09 0.15
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.08 0.15 0.20
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.06 0.14 0.20 0.25
0 0 0 0 0 0.04 0.13 0.20 0.25 0.29
0 0 0 0 0.02 0.13 0.20 0.26 0.31 0.34
0 0 0 0 0.12 0.21 0.27 0.32 0.36 0.39
0 0 0 0.11 0.22 0.29 0.34 0.38 0.63 0.63
0 0 0.09 0.23 0.32 0.37 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.63
0 0.08 0.26 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.63
0.05 0.60 0.60 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.63
Female market labor supply by marital status
with high price of home appliances (1990)
woman's wage
m
an
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The numerical exercise shows that the narrowing in the gender wage gap leads to an
indirect increase in the cohabitation rate by decreasing the number of married couples.
The decrease in the price of home appliances instead leads to a direct increase in the
cohabitation rate by increasing the absolute number of cohabiting couples. These
e¤ects are driven by changes in female labor market participation and hours of work.
1.5 Conclusions
This paper examines the rising forms of quasi marriages from an economic per-
spective. It presents some cross-country evidence on the evolvement of cohabitation
and it is an attempt of getting a more general understanding of marital behavior in
the last decade. Our conjecture is that more exible types of family are associated
with the improvement in the household production technology and the narrowing of
the gender wage gap. These changes enabled women to work more in the market and
be nancially less dependent from their partners. Likewise, these changes reduced
mens need to have a housewife for the household chores. In the data the price of
home appliances as a proxy of household production technology has a strong e¤ect on
cohabitation conrming the general view that household production technology is a
determinant of marital behavior. The gender wage gap also plays a role.
An interesting implication of the model is that women in cohabiting units do not
specialize fully at home in contrast to the married ones. This is a result of the rela-
tive instability of cohabitation as a marital institution through its ease of dissolution.
Moreover, a married woman, who does work in the market, works less hours than a
cohabiting woman at the same wage rate.
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1.6 Appendix
1.6.1 Data sources
Table A1. Data on cohabitation
Country Source
Austria Statistik Austria,www.statistik.at
Belgium17 SPF Economie - Direction generale Statistique et
Information economique selon le Registre National,
www.statbel.fgov.be
Denmark Statistics Denmark, www.dst.dk
Finland Statistics Finland, www.stat.
France INED, www.ined.fr
Germany Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland, www.destatis.de
Hungary UNECE, www.unece.org
Ireland UNECE, www.unece.org
Italy UNECE, www.unece.org
Netherlands Statistics Netherlands, www.cbs.nl
Norway Statistics Norway, www.ssb.no
Spain UNECE, www.unece.org
Sweden UNECE, www.unece.org
UK own calculations from the General Household Survey,
www.esds.ac.uk
US U.S. Census Bureau, www.census.gov
Table A2. Data on price of home appliances and CPI
Country Source
US Bureau of Labor Statistics, www.bls.gov/data
Other countries Eurostat, http//epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu
17The data for Belgium do not refer solely to cohabiting couples but also include pairs of cohabiting
persons of the same or di¤erent sex, eg. two siblings or two friends.
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Table A3. Data on price of GDP growth and urban population
Country Source
All countries World Bank (WDI), www.worldbank.org
Table A4. Data on gender wage gap
Country Source
Austria UNECE, www.unece.org
Belgium Eurostat, http//epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu
Denmark OECD, www.oecd.org
Finland OECD, www.oecd.org and UNECE, www.unece.org
France Eurostat, http//epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu and OECD
Germany Eurostat, http//epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu
Hungary UNECE, www.unece.org
Ireland Eurostat, http//epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu
Italy -
Netherlands Eurostat, http//epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu
Norway UNECE, www.unece.org
Spain Eurostat, http//epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu
Sweden Eurostat, http//epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu
UK OECD, www.oecd.org
US U.S. Census Bureau, www.census.gov
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1.6.2 First order conditions
2nd period optimal marriage proposal. The optimal marriage proposal problem
in the 2nd period is
max
cmf >0;0lmf <1;dm>0
 ln(wm + wf l
m
f   qdm   cmf ) + (1  ) ln(A(dm)(1  lmf )1 )
subject to
 ln(wf )+(1 ) ln(A((1 )wf
q
)((1 )(1 ))1 )   ln(cmf )+(1 ) ln(A(dm)(1 lmf )1 ):
The rst order conditions for interior solutions (lf > 0) are given by (M1)-(M3).
Derivating with respect to the womans consumption good we get

wm + wf lmf   qdm   cmf
= 

cmf
;
which becomes
1
wm + wf lmf   qdm   cmf
= 
1
cmf
: (M1)
Derivating with respect to the womans labor supply we get
wf
wm + wf lmf   qdm   cmf
  (1  )(1  )
(1  lmf )
= 
(1  )(1  )
(1  lmf )
;
which can be written as
wf (1  lmf )  (1  )(1  )(wm + wf lmf   qdm   cmf )
(wm + wf lmf   qdm   cmf )
= (1  )(1  ): (M2)
Lastly, derivating with respect to the amount of durables we get
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q
wm + wf lmf   qdm   cmf
  (1  )
dm
= 
(1  )
dm
;
which can be written as
qdm   (1  )(wm + wf lmf   qdm   cmf )
(wm + wf lmf   qdm   cmf )
= (1  ): (M3)
1.6.3 Robustness
The married/cohabitating man does not work full time in the market. The
model presented in Section 1.3 is based on the assumption that the man works full
time in the market and the woman allocates her time between the house- and market
work. We relax this assumption by assuming that the man devotes a xed amount
of time to housework denoted by z: The optimal marital proposal in the 2nd period
becomes
max
cmf >0;0<l
m
f 1;dm>0
 ln(cmm) + (1  ) ln(hm) (24)
subject to
cmm + c
m
f = wm(1  z) + wf lmf   qdm; (BC)
hm = A(dm)(1  lmf + z)1 ; (HPT)
and
U sf (wf )   ln(cmf ) + (1  ) ln(hm): (WPC)
The rst order condition for the womans consumption good is

wm(1  z) + wf lmf   qdm   cmf
= 

cmf
;
which becomes
1
wm(1  z) + wf lmf   qdm   cmf
= 
1
cmf
: (R1)
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Derivating with respect to the womans labor supply we get
wf
wm(1  z) + wf lmf   qdm   cmf
  (1  )(1  )
(1  lmf + z)
= 
(1  )(1  )
(1  lmf + z)
;
which can be written as
wf (1  lmf + z)  (1  )(1  )(wm(1  z) + wf lmf   qdm   cmf )
(wm(1  z) + wf lmf   qdm   cmf )
= (1  )(1  ):
(R2)
Lastly, derivating with respect to the amount of durables we get
q
wm(1  z) + wf lmf   qdm   cmf
  (1  )
dm
= 
(1  )
dm
;
which can be written as
qdm   (1  )(wm(1  z) + wf lmf   qdm   cmf )
(wm(1  z) + wf lmf   qdm   cmf )
= (1  ): (R3)
The solution is
dm =
(1  )(wf + wm)
q
+ z
(1  )(wf   wm)
q
; (25)
lmf = (1 + z)(+ (1  ))  (1  z)(1  )(1  )
wm
wf
: (26)
We then perform the numerical example of Section 1.4 for z = 0:10:
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Figure 6
When we allow the man to devote 0.10% of his time to housework the results are
similar to the ones we obtained when the man worked full time in the market. The
number of cohabiting households has slightly increased while the number of singles has
slightly decreased. This happens because a man with a relatively low salary can now
convince a woman with a high salary to cohabit with him by o¤ering his housework.
The woman makes the take-it or leave-it o¤er to the man. In Section 1.3 we
assumed that the man is the one who proposes marriage or cohabitation to the woman
upon meeting in the marriage market. We check if our results are driven by this
assumption and we examine the case that the woman makes the o¤er. The problem
of the optimal marriage proposal in the 2nd period becomes
max
cmm>0;0<l
m
f 1;dm>0
 ln(cmf ) + (1  ) ln(hm) (27)
subject to
cmm + c
m
f = wm + wf l
m
f   qdm; (BC)
hm = A(dm)(1  lmf )1 ; (HPT)
and
U sm(wm)   ln(cmm) + (1  ) ln(hm): (MPC)
The woman is now trying to maximize her utility by choosing the hours she will
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work in the market and the amount of consumption good and durable good she will
o¤er to the man. We maintain the assumption that the man works full time in the
market. The woman has to take into account the mans participation constraint in her
decision i.e. she has to be able to convince him to cohabit/get married to her.
The rst order conditions with respect to lmf and d
m are the same as in the case
that the man makes the o¤er. We obtain cmm from the mans participation constraint
which will bind (following the same reasoning as in Section 1.3) and lastly we get
cmf from the budget constraint. The woman will compare her utility in singlehood,
cohabitation, and marriage and decide whether making or not a proposal to the man
as well as the kind of the proposal (marriage or cohabitation).
The numerical example yields exactly the same results. The only di¤erence lies
on the fact that the utility of the woman is higher in marriage or cohabitation than
in singlehood, while the utility of the man is always the same as his participation
constraint is binding. This mitigates the optimal marital status that is obtained when
the man makes the take-it or leave-it o¤er.
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Chapter 2. Peer E¤ects in Young Adults
Marital Decisions
2.1 Introduction
Friends are an important part of individuals life and constitute, together with
the family, the social circle in which individuals develop. Friends often spend time
together participating in the same activities (sports, school, etc), discussing about
di¤erent topics and exchanging ideas. It is not then unrealistic to think that friends
might a¤ect each others behavior through their opinions or through imitation. In
fact, there is a large literature on peer group e¤ects showing that friends actually
a¤ect, among others, the individual performance at school (Hoxby, 2000; Sacerdote,
2001; Calvó-Armengol, Patacchini and Zenou, 2009; Boucher, Bramoullé, Djebbari,
and Fortin, 2010), obesity (Cohen-Cole and Fletcher, 2008), smoking habits (Gaviria
and Rafael, 2001; Powell, Tauras and Ross, 2005; Fletcher, 2010: Card and Giuliano,
2011), and/or alcohol consumption (Clark and Lohéac, 2007; Fletscher, 2011), fertility
(Kuziemko, 2006; Ciliberto, Miller, Nielsen, and Simonsen, 2010; Hensvik and Nillson,
2010), productivity (Falk and Ichino, 2006), the probability of nding a job (Topa,
2001; Calvó-Armengol and Jackson, 2004; Cappellari and Tatsiramos, 2010, Cingano
and Rosolia, 2012), and the probability of engaging in criminal activities (Glaeser,
Sacerdote and Scheinkman, 1996; Patacchini and Zenou, 2011).1
But what about marital decisions? Getting married or cohabiting is a decision that
many young couples face. In order to make a decision, a potential couple might discuss
with their parents, sibling or friends. If most friends of an individual are married, she
may also want to get married in order, for example, to avoid being stigmatized by her
friends. Likewise, if many of her friends are cohabiting she may also decide to do so.
1See Blume, Brock, Durlauf, and Ioannides (2011) for an excellent review of papers on social
interactions.
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What the couple considers as a norm depends not only on the society as a whole (e.g.
religion or tradition) but also on ones circle of close friends.
In this paper, we investigate whether the marital decisions of ones friends have
any e¤ect on ones own marital decisions. We use direct information on individuals
high school friends from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add
Health). We construct a balanced panel using the calendar of all past and current
relationships of the respondents, which allows us to recover the marital status and
other characteristics of each individual and of her friends at any given year. We
motivate our empirical exercise with a model of conformism and our results show that
conformism might be the key mechanism behind the observed peer group e¤ects. We
nd that an increase of one standard deviation in the percentage of friends that are
married will increase the individual probability of getting married by 2.2 percentage
points. The e¤ect is statistically signicant for females but not for males.
The biggest obstacle in identifying peer e¤ects in marital decisions of the individuals
has been data availability. In order to investigate the extent of peer group e¤ects,
Billari et al. (2007) use simulated data to show that social inuence is the key driving
force of the process of rst marriage. Drewianka (1999 and 2003) uses data from PUMS
and shows that a 10 percentage point increase in the fraction of persons aged 16-44
in a geographical area who are single leads to a decrease in individuals propensity
to marry of an order of 1.5-2.0 percentage points. Moreover, he nds evidence that
social e¤ects operate through markets (search externality) and not directly through
stigma or role modelling. Not only initiation but also termination of marriage might
be inuenced by peers. McDermott, Folwer, and Christakis (2009) show that divorce
can spread between friends, siblings and coworkers.
Let us rst discuss briey the rapid changes in marital behavior that took place
during the last decades. As Figure 1 shows, the marriage rate in the US has fallen
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drastically. Similar changes have been observed also in other developed countries.
Many studies have tried to identify the factors behind the drop in the marriage rate
(declining gender gap, Becker 1981; contraceptive pill, Goldin & Katz, 2002; household
production technology, Greenwood & Guner, 2009 to name a few). These forces are
likely to be amplied if there exist peer group e¤ects that create a social multiplier.
As a result, the e¤ect of family-friendly policies, tax reforms, divorce laws, etc. will
be augmented. Part of this drop is also due to the increase in the median age at rst
marriage (Figure 2). Individuals nowadays get married at an older age than what they
used to do in the past. Hence, also the timing of marriage may be contagious in the
sense that individuals decide to get married after observing that one of their peers got
married.
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Cohabitation is a more recent phenomenon that is becoming more and more popular
especially among young couples (Bumpass & Lu, 2000). This upward trend (Figure 3),
that is also present in western European countries, has been attributed to economic fac-
tors like the gender wage gap and the household production technology (Adamopoulou,
2010), female labor force participation and tertiary education (Kalmjin, 2007) or tax
reforms (Leturcq, 2009). In addition to these factors, there might be an imitation
e¤ect (peer e¤ect) at work that self-enforced the increase of cohabitation. Our aim
is to identify peer e¤ects in the decision to get married or cohabit as well as in the
timing of these actions. In the next section we use a model of conformism in order
to study a possible way friends can inuence an individuals marital decisions. The
model motivates the empirical analysis that follows.
2.2 Model
The model is based on Patacchini and Zenou (2011), who study juvenile delin-
quency using a model of conformism. The key element of the model is the notion of
conformism, i.e., quoting the authors description, the idea that the easiest and hence
best life is attained by doing ones very best to blend in with ones surroundings and
to do nothing eccentric or out of the ordinary in any way. Conformism might also
be important for young adults when they decide whether to get married or cohabit.
We rst dene the network structure of agentsfriendships, and we then describe the
54
2. Peer E¤ects in Young AdultsMarital Decision
preferences of the agents.
There is a nite number of agents N = f1; :::; ng. Let g denote a particular
network. We use the n-square adjacency matrix G of a network g to keep track of the
direct connections in this network (see Jackson, 2008). Two agents i and j are directly
connected in the network g if and only if gij = 1. We set gii = 0, i.e. the agent cannot be
a friend of herself. The set of direct connections of agent i is Ni(g) = fj 6= i j gij = 1g,
which is of size gi =
nX
j=1
gij: In general Ni(g) 6= Nj(g); unless the network is complete
and everybody is a friend of everybody.
Each agent decides whether to stay single and just date with a partner, cohabit or
get married. We assume, therefore, that there are many di¤erent degrees of formality
that the relationship can take ranging from very informal (dating) to very formal
(getting married). We denote the formality of the relationship by fi. We then dene
the average formality of the relationships of is friends as fi(g) = 1gi
nX
j=1
gijfj
Each agent selects a degree of formality fi  0 for her relationship and receives a
payo¤ u(fi; fi) given by the utility function
ui(fi; fi) = a+ bifi   fi  cf 2i   d(fi   fi)2;
with a; c; d > 0, and bi > 0; 8i:
There is a benet from formalizing the relationship, which is given by the term
a + bifi: The agents are ex ante heterogeneous with respect to bi: The parameter bi
is assumed to be deterministic and observable by all agents in the network and it
represents observable characteristics of individual i (e.g., gender, race, age, education,
religion etc.) and to the observable average characteristics of individual is friends
(contextual e¤ects). More specically,
bi(x) =
MX
m=1
mx
m
i +
1
gi
MX
m=1
nX
j=1
mgijx
m
j ;
where xmi are observable characteristics of individual i, the term
1
gi
MX
m=1
nX
j=1
gijx
m
j cap-
tures the contextual e¤ects, and m, m are parameters.
There is also a cost of formalizing the relationship, which is given by the term
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 fi   cf 2i : The parameter  is the probability that the relationship ends and the
parameter  is the cost of ending the relationship. The cost of ending a relationship
increases as the formality increases, i.e. it is more costly to separate if one is married
than if one is cohabiting. Likewise, it is more costly to separate if one is cohabiting
with a partner than if one is just dating this partner. The term  cf 2i is needed so as
the cost function to be convex. Transiting from cohabitation to marriage is a more
complicated procedure than transiting from dating to cohabitation.
The last term in the utility function,  d(fi   fi)2; reects the inuence of friends
behavior on own action. Each agent tries to minimize the distance between herself
and her group of friends. The agent loses utility from failing to conform to others.
Parameter d represents the taste for conformity.
In this framework there exists a unique Nash equilibrium (Patacchini and Zenou,
2011) where each individual chooses the optimal formality of relationship f i
f i =
d
c+ d
fi +
bi
2(c+ d)
  
2(c+ d)
;
which is increasing in fi. In other words, the more formal the relationships of ones
friends are, the more the individual will formalize her own relationship.
In the next section we test this result empirically and we try to gure out whether
the percentage of individualsmarried and cohabiting friends has any e¤ect on individ-
ualsdecisions to enter into marriage or cohabitation. We also discuss other possible
mechanisms that may drive the peer e¤ect in marital decisions and provide evidence
that support conformism as the main mechanism.
2.3 Data
Add Health is a longitudinal study of a nationally representative sample of ado-
lescents in grades 7-12 in the United States during the 1994-95 school year.2 In Wave I
2This research uses data from Add Health, a program project directed by Kathleen Mullan Harris
and designed by J. Richard Udry, Peter S. Bearman, and Kathleen Mullan Harris at the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and funded by grant P01-HD31921 from the Eunice Kennedy Shriver
National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, with cooperative funding from 23 other
federal agencies and foundations. Special acknowledgment is due Ronald R. Rindfuss and Barbara
Entwisle for assistance in the original design. Information on how to obtain the Add Health data les
is available on the Add Health website (http://www.cpc.unc.edu/addhealth). No direct support was
received from grant P01-HD31921 for this analysis.
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the study started with an in-school questionnaire that was administered to more than
90,000 students from 80 high schools and 52 middle schools. A subsample of them
(around 20,000) were also asked to complete in-home interviews and were followed
in subsequent waves (II, III, and IV). The last wave was conducted in 2008, when
the sample was aged 24-32. Adolescents had to answer questions about their family
background, school performance, area of residence, tobacco and alcohol consumption,
criminal activities as well as about sexual behavior (contraception, pregnancy, HIV
and STD). In Wave I adolescentsmothers were also interviewed, and as a result, we
can obtain information on their characteristics as well. However, mothers were not
interviewed in the subsequent waves so it is not possible to update this information.
Wave III in-home interviews took place in years 2001 and 2002 and were completed
by around 15,000 respondents aged 18-28. In Wave III the respondents had to list all
their current and previous sexual relationships (82% non missing responses) providing
detailed information on the starting and ending date, whether they cohabited and how
long, when they got married etc. Using this information we create a balanced panel for
the years 1995-2002. For example, if a respondent listed a relationship with a partner
for the years 2000-2002 with whom she started cohabiting in 2001 and she got married
in 2002, we will consider her single for the year 2000, cohabiting in 2001, and married
in 2002. If the respondent had more than one relationship in a given year we keep the
one with the longest overall duration. The procedure is similar to the one in Xie et al.
(2003), and Raley et al. (2007) that analyze the determinants of marital transitions.
In Wave I, data collectors assigned an identication number to each student and
provided a list of all students to the respondents in order to identify their friends.
Respondents were allowed to list up to ve male friends and up to ve female friends.
We treat two students as friends if at least one of the two has identied the other
as his/her friend. On average, each respondent has nominated 5.9 friends. As long
as their nominated friends were also interviewed (i.e. they were part of the random
subsample who completed the in-home survey), one can construct for each respondent
a set of friends with detailed Add Health information. Given that the data represent
a subsample of students within schools, not all nominated friends are interviewed and
as a result, the measures of friendscharacteristics will be imperfect. However, since
the sampling scheme was random within grades, and most friends were in the same
grade, the measures should be on average correct. On average, each respondent has
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2.2 nominated friends who were also part of the survey.
In Wave III, when the respondents were between ages 18 and 28, those who were in
grades 7 and 8 in Wave I (two youngest grades), were interviewed about their current
and former friends. In particular, data collectors presented each respondent with a
list of 10 names and asked if any of them is currently or used to be their friend. For
former friends, they also asked to state when the friendship ended and why. This
list was created, based on an algorithm, using information from club membership and
other school activities. As a result, it is possible for some respondents to identify
current as well as former friends from this list. Furthermore, for former friends it is
possible to know the year that the friendship has ended. By matching the identication
numbers of friends to respondents identication numbers we obtain information on
the characteristics of nominated friends. In this way we know at any given year the
marital status of the respondent and the marital status of his/her friends.
Our nal sample using Wave I friendship nominations consists of 2,644 respondents
with non missing relationship history that have at least one friend with non missing
relationship history as well. Given that not all nominated friends are interviewed,
restricting the sample to respondents who provided usable information for at least one
nominated friend results in this reduction of the sample. The descriptive statistics
of the individuals in our nal sample are similar to the ones of all the individuals
interviewed in wave III, ensuring that the nal sample is still representative (see Table
A1).
2.4 Empirical Strategy
Individual behavior may move conjointly with average peer group behavior for
three di¤erent reasons. i) Endogenous e¤ects; the behavior of the individual is causally
inuenced by the behavior of the group. This is the peer e¤ect that we are trying to
estimate. ii) Contextual e¤ects; the behavior of the individual is inuenced by the
characteristics of the group. For example an individual might decide to get married
because her friends are very religious independently from whether the friends are mar-
ried or not. iii) Correlated e¤ects; the individual and the group behave in the same
way due to similar environments that are unobserved or due to endogenous friendship
formation/sorting. This arises either from the fact that both the individual and her
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friends are subject to common unobserved shocks or because the individual selects
friends who are similar to her.
Manski (1993) shows that identifying the endogenous and the contextual e¤ects
separately in a reduced form linear model is not possible. This is called the reection
problem and it is due to the fact that group behavior is by denition the aggrega-
tion of individual behavior. Solutions that have been proposed in order to solve the
reection problem consist of using instrumental variables techniques, or using panel
data (see Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin, 2009; Boucher et al., 2010). Instruments
are used in order to generate variation in peer behavior that is independent from in-
dividual behavior. Examples of identication strategies with instrumental variables
include Ciliberto et al. (2010) that use the fertility of the siblings of ones colleagues
as an instrument for the fertility of ones colleagues, and Fletscher (2011) that uses
the alcohol consumption of the parents of ones classmates as an instrument for the
alcohol consumption of ones classmates. The basic idea is that siblings or parents of
peers a¤ect the behavior of the peers but have no independent e¤ect on the respon-
dents behavior. De Giorgi, Pellizzari, and Redaelli (2010), and Pattachini and Zenou
(2011) exploit the information about the whole network of friendships and instrument
the behavior of the respondents friends with the characteristics of friends of friends
who are not directly linked with the respondent. With panel data one can focus on
changes in the behavior over time in order to deal with the reection problem. In
this way, the reection problem will disappear since the characteristics of the peers
are already determined at the time that the change in individual behavior (transition
into employment, having a child, getting married etc.) takes place. Clark and Lohéac
(2007) use panel data from Waves I and II of AddHealth to examine risky behavior
(the consumption of tobacco, alcohol and marijuana). Kuziemko (2006) uses panel
data in order to show that fertility is contagious among siblings. Cappellari and Tat-
siramos (2011) use panel data to show that employed friends increase the probability
of transition into employment. In an alternative identication strategy they consider
the e¤ect of the respondent on friendstransitions and instrument the respondents
employment status with the health status.
We instrument the percentage of married and cohabiting peers using the contextual
variables. We thus assume that there is no direct e¤ect of friendscharacteristics on
respondentsdecisions and use friendscharacteristics as instruments for their marital
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behavior. This procedure is common in the literature (e.g. Gaviria and Raphael, 2001;
Powell et al., 2005).
What about correlated e¤ects? One might worry that people make new friends as
they get married, often through their spouse. Hence, it is normal for married people
to make new friends who are also married. In this case endogeneity would be a serious
problem in identifying the peer e¤ects. In the current analysis we consider friends since
high school and we have information about friendship dynamics. This solves part of
the endogenous friendship formation in later years. Moreover it is not very likely that
adolescents selected friends in high school according to characteristics that determined
their marital behavior afterwards.
We use a panel data xed e¤ects estimator in order to deal with the correlated ef-
fect. Assuming that any correlation between the behavior of the peers and individual
unobserved traits is due to traits that do not vary over time a panel data xed e¤ect
estimator can deal with the correlated e¤ect. Other studies that use a xed e¤ect
estimator are Kuziemko (2006) and Cappellari and Tatsiramos (2011). Further ro-
bustness/falsication tests using placebo peer groups in the spirit of Fletscher (2011),
and Hensvik and Nillson (2010) show that the peer e¤ect is not due to selection.
2.5 Regression analysis
The benchmark regression is
fit =
endogenous
e¤ectsz }| {
MfMit + 
CfCit +
MX
m=1
mx
m
it| {z }
individual characteristics
(gender, age, race, etc)
+
1
gi
MX
m=1
nX
j=1
mgijx
m
jt| {z }
average peer characteristics
(contextual e¤ects)
+ yt + "it
where fit is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if an individual gets married (i.e.
the individual was not married at t   1 and gets married at t), and 0 otherwise, fMit ,
fCit are the percentages of married and cohabiting peers, 
M and C are the coe¢ cients
of interest, i.e. the peer e¤ect that we are trying to estimate, xmit are the individual
characteristics of the respondents (m variables that include gender, age, education,
race, religiosity, beauty, relationship duration, out of wedlock births, mothers educa-
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tion, mothers age at rst marriage, whether the mother was married in Wave I, and
whether the mother has ever cohabited), 1
gi
nX
j=1
gijx
m
jt are the average individual and
maternal characteristics of i0s n peers (contextual variables), i.e. the percentage of
female peers, average education, percentage of African American peers, average reli-
giosity, average beauty, average relationship duration, percentage of peers with out of
wedlock births, average maternal education, average mothers age at rst marriage,
percentage of individuals whose mother was married in Wave I, and percentage of
individuals whose mother has ever cohabited.3 yt are year dummies.
2.5.1 Wave I nominations
We rst examine the determinants of the transition into rst marriage using the
friends nominations from Wave I. Here, we assume that friendships have lasted after
high school up to Wave III (i.e. for 7 years). This assumption will be relaxed after-
wards using the updated information from Wave III (only for the subsample that this
information is available). Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for a total of 2,644
respondents with non missing own and peer relationship information. Around 67% of
the respondents have one friend, 14% have 2 friends, 6% have 3 friends, 5% have 4
friends, 3% have 5 friends and less than 3% have 6-8 friends.4
We start our analysis with a linear probability model (Table 2, column 1). The
dependent variable takes the value 1 if someone who was not married in the previous
year gets married in the current year, and the value 0 otherwise. The variables of
interest are the ratio of each individuals friends that are cohabiting and the ratio of
friends that are married. We include as regressors the characteristics of the individ-
uals, such as age, gender, race, education, religiosity, and a measure of beauty (the
interviewer had to assess the physical attractiveness of the respondent). All variables
are explained in the appendix. We also include whether a respondent had an out-
of-wedlock birth in the past as this might a¤ect the probability of getting married.
We account for maternal characteristics, such as mothers marital status at Wave I,
3We do not include the average age of the peers, due to the very high correlation with the age of
the respondent (in most cases the respondent and her friends have the same age).
4In the in-school survey adolescents had nominated on average 6 friends. We consider friends
that have completed the in-home interview of Wave III in order to have information about their
relationship history. Given that only 15,000 out of 90,000 students participated in Wave III the
number of peers is reduced substantially.
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mothers education, mothers age at rst marriage and whether the mother has ever
cohabited. We include the duration of the relationship which also acts as a control for
being in a relationship (when someone is not in a relationship, relationship duration
will be zero). All these are variables commonly used in the literature when studying
the determinants of marital behavior (see Raley et al., 2007). Finally, we include year
dummies in all specications. We use the appropriate weights and robust standard
errors clustered at the school level. In this specication we also include contextual
variables, i.e. the average individual characteristics of the peers. The percentage of
married peers has a statistically signicant e¤ect on the transition into marriage. If all
the peers of a young adult get married, the individual probability of getting married
is 2.3 percentage points higher than in the case that none of his/her peers is married.
The percentage of cohabiting peers does not seem to matter.
We then perform 2SLS in order to improve the identication (Table 2, column 2,
see Tables A3 and A4 for the 1st stage regressions). Following the literature (Gaviria
and Raphael, 2001; Powell et al., 2005) we assume that the contextual variables do
not have any e¤ect on individual behavior, i.e. m = 0 (indeed their e¤ect was sta-
tistically insignicant in the OLS) and we exclude them from the regression. Instead,
we use these contextual variables as an instrument for the percentage of married and
cohabiting peers.5 The F statistic of the excluded instruments in the 1st stage is larger
than 10 (18.43 for the percentage of married peers and 23.25 for the percentage of co-
habiting peers) indicating that the instruments are not weak. The Hansen J statistic
does not reject the hypothesis of the validity of the instruments. The e¤ect of married
peers remains statistically signicant and its magnitude increases. In particular, if all
the peers of a young adult get married, the individual probability of getting married
is 6.2 percentage points higher than in the case that none of his/her peers is married.
This e¤ect is not small, given that the individuals in our sample are young (22.4 years
old) and only 16.9% of them got married. In our sample the mean of the variable
of interest (% of friends that are married) is 0.18 with a standard deviation of 0.35.
According to our estimates an increase of one standard deviation in the percentage of
friends that are married will increase the individual probability of getting married by
2.2 percentage points. This increase in peer behavior represents an increase in indi-
5Alternatively we tried to use the characteristics of friends of friends who are not directly connected
to the respondents but they turned out to be very weak instruments.
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vidual behavior of about 5.9 percent of its standard deviation (which is 0.37). This
e¤ect is not negligible.
Alternatively, we perform a panel data xed e¤ect estimation that also can deal
with the identication issues (Table 3, column 1). In this specication we include only
time varying variables (age, education, out of wedlock births and the duration of the
relationship). We also control for the average education and relationship duration of
the peers. We cannot include parental characteristics because we have information
only for Wave I (and hence no time variation). The peer e¤ect remains signicant but
decreases in magnitude.
Lastly, instead of using friends, we focus on the e¤ect of friends of friends who
are not directly connected with the respondents (Table 3, column 2). The percentage
of married friends of friends has a similar e¤ect although not statistically signicant.
Hence, there is no clear evidence of spill-over e¤ects between individuals that are only
indirectly connected with each other.
We also perform the analysis for girls and boys separately to see whether there
are any gender di¤erences with respect to the magnitude, signicance or the direction
of the e¤ect. The peer e¤ect on girls is positive, and statistically signicant (Table
4, columns 1 and 2), while the peer e¤ect on boys (Table 4, columns 3 and 4) is not
statistically signicant. This result might reect a stigma towards unmarried females
that is stronger than towards males. On the other hand, this gender di¤erence might
just reect the fact that girls have more female friends than boys, and females get
married at an earlier age than males. More specically in our sample almost 21% of
girls got married by 2002 while this percentage falls to 12% for boys. Around 56% of
girls have only female friends and 45% of boys have only male friends.
Same gender friends
One might worry that respondents nominate as friends individuals of di¤erent
gender with whom they have a sexual relationship.6 In this case, the peer e¤ect would
be spurious. Suppose that a male respondent nominates as a friend a girl with whom
he has a relationship and eventually he gets married. Hence, the percentage of married
peers increases and at the same time he transits into marriage. A situation like this
6The survey had a separate section about "special" friends and therefore the respondents were not
supposed to include them among the nominated friends.
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would be mistakenly considered as peer e¤ect although in reality the respondent and
his peer had married each other. For this reason we conduct the same analysis using
same-gender friends only. The results remain almost unchanged (Table 5) indicating
that there should be no concern about marriages among peers.
Di¤erential peer e¤ect
But who are the ones who are inuenced by their peers? Are they all the indi-
viduals or only some particular groups? In order to answer this question we analyze
separately di¤erent groups of individuals with respect to religiosity and race. Marital
behavior di¤ers substantially between religious and non religious individuals, white
and African Americans, hence the peer e¤ect might also di¤er. Indeed, when we re-
peat the analysis for di¤erent groups we nd that the peer e¤ect vanishes for the
non-religious ones (dened as those who have never attended religious services in the
past 12 months), and it becomes stronger for the religious ones (Table 6, columns 1
and 2). Moreover, the peer e¤ect is present only for less educated individuals and not
for those that they continue with their studies after highschool (Table 6, columns 3
and 4). More religious and less educated individuals are the ones that get married
early, and therefore the e¤ect comes from these particular groups of people.
Cohabitation
Next, we conduct the same analysis for the transition into cohabitation (Table 7).
In this case the dependent variable takes the value 1 if an individual was not cohabiting
at t  1 and starts cohabiting at t, and is zero otherwise. Our variables of interest are
again the percentages of married and cohabiting peers. On the one hand, we nd no
statistically signicant e¤ect of the percentage of cohabiting peers. This means that
if an individual has many cohabiting peers this will not increase her probability of
cohabiting. On the other hand, there is a negative e¤ect of the percentage of married
peers on the decision to cohabit. We interpret this as evidence in favor of conformism
with respect to marriage. If all the peers of a young adult get married, the individual
probability of entering cohabitation is 5.5 percentage points lower than in the case
that none of his/her peers is married. Hence, having married peers acts as a deterrent
to cohabitation.
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Timing of the transition
As we discussed in the introduction, the age of rst marriage has increased during
the last decades. Hence, it might be the case that the timing of marriages is contagious.
To study this we check whether the transition into marriage in a given year is a¤ected
from any peer who got married in the previous year or from any peer who started
cohabiting in the previous year. The results in Table 8 suggest that the peer e¤ect in
the timing of marriage is signicant and similar in magnitude as the peer e¤ect in the
decision to get married. Moreover, also in the case that a peer started cohabiting in
the previous year the respondents probability of getting married this year goes up (but
less than if the peer got married). There is no peer e¤ect in the timing of cohabitation
(Table 9). There is evidence of a negative e¤ect on the timing of cohabitation if some
peer got married in the last year, supporting the conformistic behavior that is entailed
with marriage.
Mechanism
From the analysis so far, there is evidence of a conformistic behavior with respect
to marriage. However, there might be alternative underlying mechanisms, such as
leisure complementarities or search externalities. A mechanism of leisure complemen-
tarities will drive individuals into marriage in order to share common interests with
their married peers. The lifestyle of married people is di¤erent from the one of singles.
As a result, a single individual with many married peers might decide to get married
in order to be able to spend time with them doing similar activities. We use the
geographical proximity of friends in order to see whether this mechanism is at work.
Small geographical distance between friends facilitates communication and encourages
them to enjoy leisure together. We use information on the county of residence of
the peers and the respondent in Wave III (Table 10). We focus on respondents that
have both a peer that resides in the same county as them and a peer that resides in
di¤erent county. This reduces the sample size. The coe¢ cient of the percentage of
same-county married friends is not statistically signicant. Hence, a mechanism of
leisure complementarities does not seem to drive the peer e¤ect on marriage.
The alternative mechanism of search externalities would induce people into mar-
riage through competition on available partners. More specically, if most of the
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friends of an individual are married or cohabit, the set of available partners shrinks
and this might make marriage more urgent. However, we have found that the percent-
age of cohabiting peers does not have any signicant e¤ect. We would expect this not
to be the case if search externalities were at work.7
2.5.2 Wave III nominations: current friends
Up to now we were using friendship nominations from Wave I in order to dene
the peer group of the respondents. In other words, we were assuming that friendships
have lasted throughout the years until Wave III. In this subsection we are going to relax
this assumption by updating the friendship information. As we already mentioned, for
the respondents of Wave III who were in the 7th or 8th grade at Wave I, an algorithm,
based on clubs and activities from previous waves, was used to select 10 names of
students who also attended the same school. These respondents were then asked to
identify whether or not they were currently or had been previously friends with each
of the 10 listed names. We then perform the analysis by using current friends as the
peer group of reference. Our sample consists of 1,065 respondents who identied at
least one current friend and have non missing own and peer relationship history. Table
11 shows the descriptive statistics for these respondents.8 To our knowledge this is
the rst study that uses the friendship information from Wave III of the Add Health
survey. One reason for this might be the small sample size. This is not an issue in our
case thanks to the retrospective panel of relationships that we have constructed.
We get larger estimates both in the 2SLS and in the xed e¤ects specication when
we repeat the analysis using only the friends that the respondents have identied as
current ones (Table 12, columns 1 and 2). The e¤ect is almost double in magnitude
(0.057 compared to 0.031 in the xed e¤ects estimation and 0.133 compared to 0.062
in the 2SLS). This is not surprising given that current friends are expected to exert
bigger inuence than the whole set of high school friends that contains both current
and former friends. There is no clear evidence of spill-over e¤ects from current friends
of current friends either (Table 12, column 3). The results in Table 13 regarding the
7Another possible mechanism is transmission of information about marriage or cohabitation
through peers. However, the absence of spill-over e¤ects from friends of friends (Table 3, column
2) suggests that such a mechanism is unlikely to be at work.
8These respondents belonged to the youngest cohort of Wave I, this is why their average age and
the % married is lower than those of all the respondents.
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transition into cohabitation provide us with a further conrmation of the conformistic
mechanism based on the big negative e¤ect of current married peers.
2.6 Robustness
At this point one may think that it is natural to nd a positive correlation among
individuals that went to the same school and share many common characteristics and
thus may doubt about the causality of the peer e¤ect. In order to convince the reader,
we perform robustness checks using di¤erent groups of peers, namely ghost and placebo
friends. The idea behind it is that if the peer e¤ect is spurious it must show up also
when considering as peer group of reference individuals with similar characteristics as
the real friends who nevertheless are not connected to the respondents.
2.6.1 Ghost friends
The rst robustness check uses "ghost" friends as the peer group of reference. We
dene ghost friends as follows. There are respondents who indicated that they had
been previously friends (but not anymore) with some of the 10 names that they were
provided with in Wave III. Moreover, we have information on the exact year that the
respondent last saw the former friend in person, talked with her on the telephone, or
exchanged email. We can thus consider the e¤ect of ghost friends, i.e. the e¤ect of
former friends in the years after the friendship has ended. We expect that ghost friends
should not have any e¤ect on the decisions of the individuals. However, there might
be concerns regarding the reasons that the friendship has ended.9 If the friendship
has ended due to the fact that former friends got married, ghost friends would not be
adequate for our robustness check. In Table 14 we display the descriptive statistics
of ghost friends in comparison with the ones of current friends. We do not observe a
bigger tendency towards marriage for ghost friends compared to current friends.
We perform the same analysis using ghost friends instead of current friends. The
percentage of married ghost friends does not have a signicant e¤ect on the transition
of individuals into marriage although the magnitude of the e¤ect is similar to the one
9There is a question about the reason why the friendship ended and the most common answer
is "it just happened/you drifted apart" among the alternatives: the friend moved away, you moved
away, the friend changed, you changed, the friend died.
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of real friends (Table 15).10 This result also alleviates the concern that individuals
may chose with whom to remain friends in an endogenous way.
2.6.2 Placebo friends
A further robustness check consists of using placebo friends as the peer group of
reference. Remember that in Wave III an algorithm, based on clubs and activities from
previous waves, was used to select 10 names of students who also attended the same
school. In certain cases the respondents indicated that they did not know some of
the 10 names. The unidentied names correspond to individuals that could have been
potentially friends with the respondent given that the 10 names were not random, but
the algorithm selected them among students of the same school who were doing similar
activities with the respondent. Thus, we can exploit this feature of the algorithm and
dene these unidentied individuals as placebo friends. Table 16 demonstrates that
the characteristics of placebo and real friends are similar. Not surprisingly, when we
perform the robustness check placebo friends do not have any signicant e¤ect either
(Tables 17a and 17b, columns 1, for the 2SLS and the xed e¤ects estimates). The peer
e¤ect in the benchmark specications has not washed out with the reduced sample size
corresponding to individuals that have at least one placebo friend (Tables 17a and 17b,
columns 2). It is thus actual peers, and not just students from the same school that
do matter for the decisions of the respondents. This robustness check is supportive of
a causal interpretation of the e¤ect of real friends.
2.6.3 Friends that enter into marriage/cohabitation the year after
The last robustness check concerns the timing of the transition into marriage. As
we saw in Table 8, if any peer got married in the previous year, this would a¤ect the
transition of the respondent into marriage in the current year. However, we expect
that if any peer gets married next year, this will not have any e¤ect on the transition
of the respondent into marriage in the current year. Indeed, this is the case as Table
18 shows. Hence, the timing of marriage is indeed contagious.
10We may lose statistical signicance also due to the small sample size.
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2.7 Conclusions
The analysis shows a positive and signicant peer e¤ect on the transition of singles
into marriage. According to our estimates an increase of one standard deviation in
the percentage of friends that are married will increase the individual probability of
getting married by 2.2 percentage points. This increase in peer behavior represents
an increase in individual behavior of about 5.9 percent of its standard deviation. The
e¤ect is present for girls, religious and white people. The fact that there is no signicant
e¤ect of ghost and placebo friends indicates that real peers do matter. There does not
seem to exist a peer e¤ect on the transition into cohabitation. Instead, there is a
negative e¤ect of the percentage of married peers on the respondentstransition into
cohabitation. This is an indication of a conformistic behavior with respect to marriage.
There is no evidence of leisure complementarities or search externalities. The social
multiplier has to be taken into account when analyzing the e¤ect of family-friendly
policies, tax reforms, divorce laws or other policies that may a¤ect the incentives to
get married.
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2.8 Tables
Table 1. Individual characteristics in 20021;2 (Wave I nominations)
Characteristic
% females 55.27
Mean Age 22.42
(0.186)
% cohabiting 19.24
% married 16.94
% African American 10.57
% with >high school education 61.09
Mean Religiosity (7-category scale) 1.95
(0.089)
Mean Beauty (5-category scale) 3.57
(0.032)
1
Individuals with non missing own and peersrelationship history
2
Corrected for survey design using school as a cluster variable, region as a strata variable,
and appropriate weights
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Table 2. Determinants of transition into marriage (Pooled OLS and 2SLS)
(1) (2)
Specication Pooled OLS 2SLS
Denition of Peers Nominated friends Nominated friends
% married peers 0.023** 0.062**
(0.011) (0.030)
% cohabiting peers 0.004 -0.051
(0.065) (0.045)
Individual characteristics Yes Yes
Parental characteristics Yes Yes
Contextual characteristics Yes Used as instruments
No of person-years 15,709 14,662
No of clusters 126 126
R2 0.069 0.054
F-statistic 1st stage - 18.43; 23.25
J statistic p value - 0.6214
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (robust s.e. clustered at school level), cross sectional weights used
Individual characteristics: gender, age, education, race, religiosity, beauty, relationship duration,
out of wedlock births, Parental characteristics: marital status at Wave I, mothers education, age
at rst marriage, whether ever cohabited, Excluded instruments: peerseducation, religiosity, beauty
relationship dur, out of wedlock births, % females, % African Americans, % with married mothers
Year dummies included in all specications
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Table 3. Determinants of transition into marriage (Fixed e¤ects)
(1) (2)
Specication Linear Prob/FE Linear Prob/FE
Denition of Peers Nominated friends Nominated friends of friends
% married peers 0.031** 0.029
(0.013) (0.024)
% cohabiting peers 0.009 0.000
(0.007) (0.012)
Individual characteristics Yes Yes
Parental characteristics No No
Contextual characteristics Yes Yes
No of person-years 19,629 10,364
No of clusters 130 79
R2 0.053 0.052
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (robust s.e. clustered at school level), cross sectional weights used
Individual characteristics (time varying): age, education, out of wedlock births, relationship dur.
Contextual characteristics: average education, and average relationship duration
Year dummies included in all specications
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Table 4. Girlsand boysdeterminants of transition into marriage (2SLS and xed e¤ects)
Girls Boys
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Specication 2SLS Linear Prob/FE 2SLS Linear Prob/FE
Denition of Peers Nomin. friends Nomin. friends Nomin. friends Nomin. friends
% married peers 0.099** 0.032* 0.039 0.029
(0.047) (0.017) (0.038) (0.022)
% cohabiting peers -0.097 0.005 -0.028 0.015
(0.066) (0.011) (0.064) (0.010)
Individual char. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parental char. Yes No Yes No
Contextual char. Used as instrum. Yes Used as instrum. Yes
No of person-years 7,956 10,791 6,706 8,838
R2 0.041 0.051 0.046 0.056
F-statistic 1st stage 12.30; 11.41 - 11.33; 6.12 -
J statistic p value 0.744 - 0.574 -
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (robust s.e. clustered at school level), cross sectional weights used
Control variables: see Table 2 for 2SLS specication, and Table 3 for FE specication
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Table 5. Determinants of transition into marriage (same gender friends)
(1) (2)
Specication 2SLS Linear Prob/FE
Denition of Peers Same gender friends Same gender friends
% married peers 0.060* 0.031**
(0.033) (0.015)
% cohabiting peers -0.006 0.008
(0.042) (0.009)
Individual char. Yes Yes
Parental char. Yes No
Contextual char. Used as instruments Yes
No of person-years 11,324 15,281
R2 0.055 0.053
F-statistic 1st stage 18.94; 16.75 -
J statistic 0.666 -
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (robust s.e. clustered at school level)
Control variables: see Table 2 for 2SLS specication, and Table 3 for FE specication
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Table 6. Determinants of transition into marriage by characteristic
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Specication Linear Prob/FE Linear Prob/FE Linear Prob/FE Linear Prob/FE
Denition of Peers Religious Non-religious High school or less More than high school
% married peers 0.037*** 0.019 0.039* 0.017
(0.013) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021)
% cohabiting peers 0.010 0.010 0.007 0.010
(0.008) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013)
Individual char. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parental char. No No No No
Contextual char. Yes Yes Yes Yes
No of person-years 14,634 4,995 11,016 8,613
R2 0.058 0.045 0.059 0.049
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (robust s.e. clustered at school level), cross sectional weights used
Individual characteristics (time varying): age, education, out of wedlock births, relationship dur.
Contextual characteristics: average education, and average relationship duration
Year dummies included in all specications
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Table 7. Determinants of transition into cohabitation (2SLS and xed e¤ects)
(1) (2)
Specication 2SLS Linear Prob/FE
Denition of Peers Nominated friends Nominated friends
% married peers -0.055* -0.003
(0.031) (0.018)
% cohabiting peers 0.076 0.005
(0.049) (0.013)
Individual char. Yes Yes
Parental char. Yes No
Contextual char. Used as instruments Yes
No of person-years 14,408 19,783
No of clusters 126 130
R2 0.029 0.020
F-statistic 1st stage 19.53; 18.86 -
J statistic 0.717 -
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (robust s.e. clustered at school level), cross sectional weights used
Variables in the FE specication: age, education, rel. duration, peersaverage education, rel. duration
Variables in the 2SLS specication: age, race, gender, education, relationship dur, religiosity, beauty,
all parental characteristics, Excluded instruments: peerseducation, religiosity, beauty, rel. duration,
out of wedlock births, % females, % African Americans, % with ever cohabiting mother.
Year dummies in all specications
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Table 8. Determinants of the timing of the transition into marriage (Fixed e¤ects)
(1)
Specication Linear Prob/FE
Denition of Peers Nominated friends
Any peer entered marriage in the previous year 0.032*
(0.017)
Any peer entered cohabitation in the previous year 0.013*
(0.007)
Individual characteristics Yes
Parental characteristics No
Contextual characteristics Yes
No of person-years 17,009
R2 0.048
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (robust s.e. clustered at school level), cross sectional weights used
Control variables: see Table 3
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Table 9. Determinants of the timing of the transition into cohabitation (Fixed e¤ects)
(1)
Specication Linear Prob/FE
Denition of Peers Nominated friends
Any peer entered marriage in the previous year -0.017*
(0.010)
Any peer entered cohabitation in the previous year 0.0003
(0.012)
Individual characteristics Yes
Parental characteristics No
Contextual characteristics Yes
No of person-years 17,170
R2 0.015
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (robust s.e. clustered at school level), cross sectional weights used
Control variables: see Table 3
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Table 10. Transition into marriage and geographical proximity
(1)
Specication Linear Prob/FE
Denition of Peers Nominated friends
% married peers 0.122**
(0.046)
% same county married peers -0.005
(0.034)
% cohabiting peers 0.043
(0.040)
% same county cohabiting peers -0.005
(0.018)
Individual characteristics Yes
Parental characteristics No
Contextual characteristics Yes
No of person-years 3,352
R2 0.064
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (robust s.e. clustered at school level), cross sectional weights used
Control variables: see Table 3
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Table 11. Individual characteristics in 20021,2 (Wave III nominations)
Characteristic
% females 49.37
Mean Age 20.61
(0.036)
% cohabiting 19.20
% married 7.27
% African American 12.71
% with >high school education 50.43
Mean Religiosity (7-category scale) 2.19
(0.106)
Mean Beauty (5-category scale) 3.56
(0.047)
1 Individuals with non missing own and peersrelationship history
2 Corrected for survey design using school as a cluster variable,
region as a strata variable and appropriate weights
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Table 12. Determinants of transition into marriage (current friends)
(1) (2) (3)
Specication 2SLS Linear Prob/FE Linear Prob/FE
Denition of Peers Current friends Current friends Current friends of friends
% married peers 0.133** 0.057* 0.058
(0.053) (0.029) (0.040)
% cohabiting peers -0.043 0.013 0.017
(0.034) (0.013) (0.014)
Individual char. Yes Yes Yes
Parental char. Yes No No
Contextual char. Used as instruments Yes Yes
No of person-years 6,637 8,252 2,980
No of clusters 68 70 54
R2 0.012 0.031 0.021
F-statistic 1st stage 4.95; 10.53 - -
J statistic 0.897 - -
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (robust s.e. clustered at school level)
Control variables: see Table 2 for 2SLS specication, and Table 3 for FE specication
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Table 13. Determinants of transition into cohabitation (current friends)
(1) (2)
Specication 2SLS Linear Prob/FE
Denition of Peers Current friends Current friends
% married peers -0.171* -0.056**
(0.099) (0.021)
% cohabiting peers 0.016 0.001
(0.063) (0.025)
Individual char. Yes Yes
Parental char. Yes No
Contextual char. Used as instruments Yes
No of person-years 6,501 8,081
No of clusters 68 70
R2 0.058 0.041
F-statistic 1st stage 5.45; 8.16 -
J statistic 0.555 -
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (robust s.e. clustered at school level)
Control variables: see Table 7
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Table 14. Real vs ghost friendscharacteristics in 20021,2
Characteristic Real friends Ghost friends
% married 7.27 8.47
% cohabiting 19.20 20.66
% females 49.37 60.22
Mean Age 20.61 20.63
% African American 12.71 15.07
% with > high school education 50.43 54.18
Religiosity (5-category scale) 2.19 2.06
Beauty (5-category scale) 3.56 3.61
1 Individuals with non missing relationship history
2 Corrected for survey design using school as a cluster variable,
region as a strata variable and appropriate weights
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Table 15. Determinants of transition into marriage (ghost friends)
(1) (2)
Specication 2SLS Linear Prob/FE
Denition of Peers Ghost friends Ghost friends
% married peers -0.057 0.035
(0.102) (0.029)
% cohabiting peers 0.054 -0.006
(0.071) (0.014)
Individual char. Yes Yes
Parental char. Yes No
Contextual char. Used as instruments Yes
No of person-years 2,897 3,452
No of clusters 67 67
R2 0.067 0.043
F-statistic 1st stage 4.05; 11.07 -
J statistic 0.914 -
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (robust s.e. clustered at school level)
Control variables: see Table 7
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Table 16. Real vs placebo friendscharacteristics in 20021,2
Characteristic Real friends Placebo friends
% married 7.27 9.71
% cohabiting 19.20 21.16
% females 49.37 60.53
Mean Age 20.61 20.72
% African American 12.71 19.49
% with > high school education 50.43 47.27
Religiosity (5-category scale) 2.19 2.09
Beauty (5-category scale) 3.56 3.55
1 Individuals with non missing relationship history
2 Corrected for survey design using school as a cluster variable,
region as a strata variable and appropriate weights
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Table 17a. Determinants of transition into marriage (placebo friends)
(1) (2)
Specication 2SLS 2SLS
Denition of Peers Placebo friends Real friends (benchmark)
% married peers 0.024 0.149***
(0.066) (0.055)
% cohabiting peers 0.008 -0.045*
(0.507) (0.024)
Individual char. Yes Yes
Parental char. Yes Yes
Contextual char. Used as instruments Used as instruments
No of person-years 5,638 5,638
No of clusters 68 68
R2 0.044 0.022
F-statistic 1st stage 5.61; 16.23 4.45; 9.43
J statistic 0.652 0.717
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (robust s.e. clustered at school level)
Control variables: see Table 7
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Table 17b. Determinants of transition into marriage (placebo friends)
(1) (2)
Specication Linear Prob/FE Linear Prob/FE
Denition of Peers Placebo friends Real friends (benchmark)
% married peers 0.002 0.064**
(0.021) (0.030)
% cohabiting peers 0.015 0.005
(0.014) (0.012)
Individual char. Yes Yes
Parental char. No No
Contextual char. Yes Yes
No of person-years 7,066 7,066
No of clusters 70 70
R2 0.028 0.034
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (robust s.e. clustered at school level)
Control variables: see Table 7
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Table 18. Determinants of the timing of the transition into marriage (Robustness)
(1)
Specication Linear Prob/FE
Denition of Peers Nominated friends
Any peer enters marriage in the year after 0.012
(0.012)
Any peer enters cohabitation in the year after -0.004
(0.006)
Individual characteristics Yes
Parental characteristics No
Contextual characteristics Yes
No of person-years 17,498
R2 0.065
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (robust s.e. clustered at school level), cross sectional weights used
Control variables: see Table 3
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2.9 Appendix
Table A1. Samples characteristics in 20021
Characteristic All individuals2 Sample3
% married 17.67 16.94
% cohabiting 21.77 19.24
% females 51.40 55.26
Mean Age 22.59 22.41
% African American 15.04 10.56
% with > high school education 53.05 61.09
Religiosity (5-category scale) 1.92 1.96
Beauty (5-category scale) 3.51 3.58
N 10,220 2,644
1 Corrected for survey design using school as a cluster variable,
region as a strata variable and appropriate weights
2 Individuals with non missing own relationship history
3 Individuals with non missing own and friendsrelationship history
89
2. Peer E¤ects in Young AdultsMarital Decision
Table A2. Denition of Variables
Variable Type Values
Gender binary
8<: 0 if male1 if female
Age continuous [18, 28]
Race binary
8<: 0 if not African American1 if African American
Education binary
8<: 0 if high school or less1 if more than high school
Religiosity
(Attendance in
religious services)
ordinal
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
0 never
1 a few times
2 several times
3 once a month
4 two or three times a month
5 once a week
6 more than once a week
Beauty ordinal
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
1 very unattractive
2 unattractive
3 about average
4 attractive
5 very attractive
Parental marital status binary
8<: 0 if parents were married in wave I1 otherwise
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Mothers education binary
8<: 0 if high school or less1 if more than high school
Mothers age at rst marriage continuous [13, 53]
Mother ever cohabited binary
8<: 1 if the mother has ever cohabited0 otherwise
Out of wedlock births binary
8<: 1 if birth before the 9th month of marriage0 otherwise
Relationship duration continuous in years (=0 if not currently in a relationship)
Contextual average of all characteristics
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Table A3. IV-Auxilliary Equation
Instrumented: % married peers
Coe¢ cient Std. Error
Gender -0.0041 0.0109
Age 0.0126*** 0.0035
Race 0.0072 0.0438
Education -0.0013 0.0138
Religiosity 0.0026 0.0035
Beauty -0.0028 0.0045
Mother married at wave I -0.0205* 0.0114
Mothers age at rst marriage -0.0035*** 0.0010
Mothers education 0.0088 0.0076
Mother ever cohabited 0.0234 0.0156
Out of wedlock birth 0.0025 0.0218
Relationship duration -0.0016 0.0029
y1995 0.0670** 0.0269
y1996 0.0466** 0.0248
y1997 0.0332 0.0234
y1998 0.0236 0.0211
y1999 0.0282* 0.0163
y2000 0.0247** 0.0104
y2001 0.0283*** 0.0060
% female peers 0.0124 0.0125
% African American peers -0.0871** 0.0428
average rel. duration 0.0465*** 0.0060
% peers with out of wed birth 0.2386*** 0.0364
% peers with married mother -0.0233 0.0175
average education -0.0419* 0.0214
average religiosity 0.0151*** 0.0041
average beauty -0.0150* 0.0082
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No of person-years 14,662
R2 0.278
*** p<0.001, **p<0.05, *p<0.10, rob s.e. clustered at school level
Cross sectional weights used
F test of excluded instruments: F(8,125)=18.43, Prob>F=0.000
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Table A4. IV-Auxilliary Equation
Instrumented: % cohabiting peers
Coe¢ cient Std. Error
Gender -0.0056 0.0101
Age 0.0114*** 0.0036
Race -0.0579** 0.0259
Education -0.0202* 0.0119
Religiosity -0.0020 0.0025
Beauty 0.0126** 0.0052
Mother married at wave I 0.0328** 0.0164
Mothers age at rst marriage -0.0010 0.0012
Mothers education -0.0118 0.0079
Mother ever cohabited -0.0280 0.0188
Out of wedlock birth 0.0025 0.0230
Relationship duration 0.0038 0.0038
y1995 -0.0179 0.0257
y1996 -0.0092 0.0247
y1997 -0.0022 0.0238
y1998 -0.0009 0.0224
y1999 0.0125 0.0208
y2000 0.0054 0.0153
y2001 0.0144** 0.0068
% female peers 0.0149 0.0121
% African American peers 0.0354 0.0284
average rel. duration 0.0299*** 0.0046
% peers with out of wed birth 0.1150*** 0.0382
% peers with married mother 0.0263* 0.0151
average education -0.0364** 0.0141
average religiosity -0.0142*** 0.0023
average beauty -0.0127 0.0078
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No of person-years 14,662
R2 0.139
*** p<0.001, **p<0.05, *p<0.10, rob s.e. clustered at school level
Cross sectional weights used
F test of excluded instruments: F(8,125)=23.25, Prob>F=0.000
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Chapter 3 Young Adults Living with their Parents
and the Inuence of Peers (joint with Ezgi Kaya)
3.1 Introduction
There is a growing literature that documents the importance of peer decisions and
peer characteristics on individual behavior, mainly focusing on educational outcomes
and health decisions. Peer group e¤ects have been shown to be important in academic
achievement (Hoxby, 2000; Sacerdote, 2001; Calvó-Armengol, Patacchini and Zenou,
2009; Boucher, Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin, 2010). There is evidence that peers
inuence individual health decisions such as the use of drugs (Gaviria and Raphael,
2001; Card and Giuliano, 2011), smoking habits (Gaviria and Rafael, 2001; Powell,
Tauras and Ross, 2005; Lundborg, 2006; Fletcher, 2010; Card and Giuliano, 2011),
alcohol consumption (Lundborg, 2006; Clark and Lohéac, 2007; Fletcher, 2011) and
sex initiation (Fletcher 2007, Fernández-Villaverde, Greenwood and Guner 2010; Card
and Giuliano, 2011). Recent studies also provide evidence on peer inuence on marital
decisions (Adamopoulou, 2012), fertility (Kuziemko, 2006; Ciliberto, Miller, Nielsen,
and Simonsen, 2010; Hensvik and Nillson, 2010) and the probability of nding a job
(Calvó-Armengol and Jackson, 2004; Cappellari and Tatsiramos, 2011). In this paper,
we study the inuence of high school friends on young adultsliving arrangements in
the US both in a static and in a dynamic framework. Living arrangements refer to
coresidence with parents, i.e., whether the young adult still coresides with at least one
parent or no. There is no other study, to our knowledge, that investigates peer group
e¤ects on living arrangements of young adults. This study lls this gap in the peer
group e¤ects literature.
Leaving the parental home is the rst step in the transition to adulthood and it
is often associated with economic independence and family formation. As the living
arrangements of young adults are closely related to fertility, mobility and labor mar-
ket outcomes, they have received a lot of attention in the economic literature. Many
studies emphasize the importance of leaving the parental home in the life course path
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and point out socioeconomic circumstances as determinants of the living arrangements
of young adults.1 Other studies examine the strong heterogeneity across countries re-
garding the explanatory factors and the timing of leaving the parental home.2 What
emerges in cross country comparisons is that young adults in the U.S. tend to leave
parental home relatively earlier than their European counterparts (Yi et al., 1994; Ia-
covou, 2002). Given that there is a lot of heterogeneity in living arrangements, peer
e¤ects may act as a reinforcement mechanism. Our ndings add to the literature that
focuses on the determinants of the living arrangements of young adults. It is well
documented that there are substantial gender, race and socioeconomic class di¤eren-
tials in living arrangements.3 Women stop living with their parents earlier than men.
This is due to di¤erences in the age at marriage but also due to gender di¤erences
in the relationship between the parents and the child (Goldscheider and DaVanzo,
1985). Since daughters are commonly monitored by parents more than sons (Ward
and Spitze, 1992) and they are expected to do more housework (White, 1994), living
with parents after age 18 may be less benecial for daughters than sons (Goldschei-
der and Waite, 1991). In terms of racial or ethnical di¤erences, African Americans
and Hispanics are substantially more likely than non-Hispanic whites to live in ex-
tended families (Beck and Beck, 1984). Moreover, non coresidents are more likely
to come from relatively richer and more educated families than coresidents (Rosen-
zweig and Wolpin,1993). Besides the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics,
Ermisch (1999) and Martínez-Granado and Ruiz-Castillo (2002) show that housing
market conditions signicantly a¤ect the living arrangements of the young in the UK
and Spain respectively. Martins and Villanueva (2009) show that limited access to
mortgage debt can explain why many young adults in Portugal live with their parents.
Peer inuence is another issue that remains unexplored. When young adults decide
whether to continue living with their parents or move out of the parental home, the
1See Eurofond (2006) for the consequences of late emancipation of young adults on future geo-
graphic and job mobility; Esping-Andersen (1999), Manacorda and Moretti (2006), Giuliano (2007),
Chiuri and Del Boca (2010) for the possible consequences of the late emancipation of young adults
in Southern Europe on the labor force participation, unemployment and fertility rate.
2See Kiernan (1986) for an international comparison of young adultsliving arrangements in Den-
mark, Great Britain and the United States; Yi, Coale, Choe, Zhiwu and Li (1994) for a comparision
of year age-specic net rates of leaving home for men and women in China, Japan, South Korea, the
United States, Sweden and France; Iacovou (2002) for living arrangements of young adults in Europe
and the United States.
3See White (1994) for a review of studies on young adultscoresidence with their parents and their
nest-leaving behavior.
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nest leaving behavior of their friends might play a role. We add to this strand of
the literature, by documenting that also peer behavior has a strong impact on the
living arrangements of young adults when demographic, socioeconomic and state level
characteristics are accounted for.
One recent paper in the literature that is related to ours is Belot and Ermisch
(2009) that study whether friendship ties a¤ect geographical mobility. They develop
a model of investment in friendship formation and argue that mobility can destroy
friendship ties due to distance, which is costly. Using data from the British Household
Panel Survey on singles aged 18-50, they show that people with more close friends
are less likely to move. By contrast, we focus on young adults aged 19-29 and their
coresidence with parents. Our results are also related to the ndings of Giuliano
(2007) who studies whether cultural norms matter for the living arrangements of young
adults in Western Europe. Using data on the country of origin of second-generation
immigrants in the U.S., she nds that in both 1970 and 2000, the living arrangements
of second-generation immigrants in the U.S. are similar to the living arrangements of
their respective counterparts in the country of origin. We complement her ndings
by showing that peers also have an impact on living arrangements of the youth. Peer
e¤ects is a di¤erent dimension of culture than the country of origin. In our analysis,
which is not limited to immigrants, we control for parental and racial characteristics
and we investigate this further dimension of culture based on peer interactions.
Moreover, in recent years, there has been an increase in the proportion of young
adults who are living with their parents (Figure 1).4 Dyrda, Kaplan, and Ríos-Rull
(2012) attribute this increase to the recent crisis that resulted in many young people
being unemployed. Unemployed young adults may seek for insurance at their parental
home either by not leaving it or by returning to it. In fact, Kaplan (2012) builds a
structural model and shows that moving back to the parental home acts as insurance
against labor market shocks. We do not try to explain this trend through peer e¤ects.
Nevertheless, if there are signicant peer e¤ects on the decision of young adultsliving
arrangements, we expect to observe a further increase in the proportion of young adults
living with their parents.
4The increase in the percentage of young adults living with their parents was combined with
a decrease in geographical mobility of both young females and young males in the U.S., with the
decrease being more pronounced for young adults in the age group 18-29. See Figures A1 and A2 in
the Appendix.
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Figure 1. Percentage of males and females aged 18-29 that live
with their parents, 1999-2011
We use data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health in order
to investigate the inuence of high school friends on the living arrangements of young
adults aged 18-28 in the U.S. To overcome the challenges in identifying peer e¤ects,
we rst analyze them in a static framework employing instrumental variables tech-
niques. In particular, we use friends characteristics as instruments for their living
arrangements. In the static setting, we consider high school friends and their living
arrangements when they are young adults. We estimate cross-sectional regressions in
order to quantify the impact of friends since high school on the individuals probability
of living with parents during young adulthood. Hence, we regress the percentage of
high school friends who live with their parents during young adulthood on the indi-
viduals probability to live with his/her parents as a young adult. Then we move to
a dynamic framework, where we exploit the di¤erences in the timing of moving out of
the parental home for young adults and their friends in order to achieve identication.
Our results consistently suggest that there is a signicant positive peer e¤ect on the
living arrangements of young adults. In particular, an increase of one standard de-
viation in the percentage of friends that still live with their parents will increase the
individual probability of living with the parents by 3.3 percentage points.
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3.2 Add Health Data
The data we use in this paper brings together information on high school friends
and their coresidence with parents during young adulthood from the National Lon-
gitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (hereinafter Add Health).5 Add Health is a
longitudinal study of a nationally representative sample of adolescents in grades 7-12
in the United States during the 1994-95 school year. In 1994-95 the study started
with an in-school questionnaire that was administered to more than 90,000 students
from 80 high schools and 52 middle schools. A subsample of them (around 20,000)
were also asked to complete in-home interviews and were followed in three subsequent
waves. The respondents answered questions about their family background, school
performance, tobacco and alcohol consumption, criminal activities as well as area of
residence and other coresident members of the household. In the rst wave respon-
dents were asked to nominate up to ve best male and ve best female friends. In the
same wave, adolescentsparents were also interviewed about family and relationships,
and as a result, we can obtain information on their characteristics as well. However,
parents were not interviewed in the subsequent waves so it is not possible to update
this information.
In this analysis, we use the in-home interview data on adolescents and the informa-
tion about their friends in 1994-1995 (Wave I) when the adolescents were aged 11-21
and the follow-up data in 2002-2003 (Wave III) when the respondents have become
young adults aged 18-28.6 Given that the median age at leaving parental home is
around 21-22 for females and 22-24 for males (Iacovou, 2002) we focus on coresidence
with parents when they are at this age.7 We determine the coresidence with parents
5This research uses data from Add Health, a program project directed by Kathleen Mullan Harris
and designed by J. Richard Udry, Peter S. Bearman, and Kathleen Mullan Harris at the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and funded by grant P01-HD31921 from the Eunice Kennedy Shriver
National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, with cooperative funding from 23 other
federal agencies and foundations. Special acknowledgment is due Ronald R. Rindfuss and Barbara
Entwisle for assistance in the original design. Information on how to obtain the Add Health data les
is available on the Add Health website (http://www.cpc.unc.edu/addhealth). No direct support was
received from grant P01-HD31921 for this analysis.
6Add Health data have been used in the literature in order to analyze peer e¤ects but most studies
focus only on behaviors while at school (Wave I). The only exceptions that study a more dynamic
aspect of peer e¤ects using subsequent waves of Add Health are Bifulco, Fletscher and Ross (2011),
Pattachini, Rainone and Zenou (2012), and Adamopoulou (2012).
7Wave II in-home interviews were conducted in 1996, about one year after Wave I and adolescents
in grades 8-12 (aged 11-23) were interviewed. Since in Wave II more than 90% of the adolescents
were still below the legal age for children to be released from parental authority, we rather focus on
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using the information on the household roster in both waves. Young adults are dened
as coresidents with parents, if at least one of the household members is identied as
either father, mothers husband, mothers partner, mother, fathers wife or fathers
partner and non-coresident otherwise.8
Our sample consists of respondents who completed both Wave I and Wave III
in home-surveys and provided information on household roster in both waves. We
restrict our sample to respondents who were living at least with one parent in Wave
I.9 In Wave III, we only consider the respondents that live in a private accommodation
(with parents, with relatives or non-relatives or living alone) or in a dormitory and
we exclude those that are homeless or live in group quarters, whose behavior might
reect necessity and not a voluntary decision. Finally, we restrict the sample to those
who provided usable information for at least one nominated friend.
Information on friendships comes from Wave I (either from the in-home or the
in-school questionnaire). As mentioned before, in Wave I, data collectors assigned
an identication number to each student and provided a list of all students to the
respondents in order to identify up to ve male friends and up to ve female friends.
On average, each respondent has nominated 5.9 friends. We do not have information on
out-of-school friends because of the Add Health sampling frame. However, the number
of out-of-school friends was quite small (less than 1 friend, 0.8 per respondent). We
did not require that nominations were mutual when constructing the peer group of
reference for each respondent. Those that the respondent nominated as friends are
likely to inuence him/her even if they, in turn, did not nominate him/her as a friend.
As long as nominated friends were also interviewed (i.e. they were part of the random
subsample who completed the in-home survey), one can construct for each respondent
a set of friends with detailed Add Health information. Given that the data represent
a subsample of students within schools, not all nominated friends are interviewed and
the living arrangements in Wave III. On the other hand, Wave IV in home interviews were conducted
in 2007-2009, almost 14 years after Wave I, and the respondents were 24-34 years old. However, it
is unlikely that high school friendships are maintained for so many years after high school. Hence,
we study peer e¤ects in Wave III, only 8 years after Wave I, when friendships are more likely to still
hold. There is very limited information on whether high school friends are still friends in Wave III.
However, there is clearly a selection issue regarding the continuation of friendships after high school.
Therefore, we consider all friends that the respondents nominated in Wave I.
8Mother and/or father can be biological, step, adoptive or foster.
9More than 94 percent of the adolescents in Wave I were living with at least one parent (14,247
of 15,088 valid cases).
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as a result, the measures of friendscharacteristics will be imperfect. However, since
the sampling scheme for the in-home interview was random, the measures should be
on average correct. On average, each respondent has 2.2 nominated friends who were
also part of the survey.
Our nal sample consists of 3,949 respondents with non missing coresidence infor-
mation that have at least one friend with non missing coresidence information as well.
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for those still coresiding with their parents
when they are young adults and for non-coresidents.10 The category of coresidents
includes also those that might have changed place of residence together with their
parents and continued living with them in the new place of residence and the ones
who might have moved out from parental home between Wave I and Wave III but
have returned back home and co-reside with their parents in Wave III.
In line with ndings from earlier studies Table 1 shows that, compared to non
coresidents, coresidents are mostly men, single, and younger. Moreover, coresidents
are more likely to be Hispanic or African American, without college education, and
not employed. Parental characteristics also make a di¤erence in living arrangements
of young adults; non coresidents are more likely to come from relatively richer and
more educated families than coresidents. Lastly, the relationship of the respondents
with their parents during adolescence di¤ers for coresidents and non-coresidents.11
3.3 Identication issues
Our outcome of interest is the coresidence of young adults with their parents.
To determine the peer group e¤ects on young adultscoresidence with parents, our
benchmark regression is as follows:
lis=
endogenous
e¤ectsz }| {

 
l is +
MX
m=1
mx
m
is| {z }
individual char.
+
1
gi
MX
m=1
nX
j=1
mgijx
m
js| {z }
average peer char.
(gender, age, etc)
+ s+"is; (1)
10For the description of variables see Table A.2 in the Appendix.
11The descriptive statistics of the individuals in our nal sample are similar to the ones of all the
individuals interviewed in Wave III, ensuring that the nal sample is still representative. See Table
A1 for a comparison with the descriptive statistics of the full sample in Wave III.
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where lis is the binary variable for the coresidence status of young adult i living in
state s. lis takes the value 0 if a young adult who was living with at least one parent
when she/he was adolescent is not living with the parents anymore, and the value 1
if she/he continues living with at least one parent.
 
l is is the percentage of peers
(nominated friends, or same grade students from the same block in Wave I) that live
with their parents during young adulthood, excluding individual i; and  is the coef-
cient of interest, i.e. the peer e¤ect that we are trying to estimate. xmit is a vector
of family and individual characteristics with parameter vector m that might act as
determinants of young adultscoresidence behavior as we discuss in the next subsec-
tion. The parameter vector, m captures contextual e¤ects, i.e. the inuence of the
average peer characteristics on young adults coresidence status. For this purpose, we
dene gij as the indicator function that reects the direct connection of two individ-
uals in a friendsnetwork g with N = f1; :::; ng members. Hence, two individuals i
and j are directly connected if and only if gij = 1. We set gii = 0 since an individual
cannot be a friend of herself. Finally gi is dened as gi =
nX
j=1
gij ;which is the size of
the direct connections of individual i. The set of direct connections of individual i is
Ni(g) = fj 6= i j gij = 1g, which is of size gi and unless the network is complete and
everybody is a friend of everybody, the size of the direct connections are individual
specic (Ni(g) 6= Nj(g)).12 Finally s are state dummies that capture the state specic
xed e¤ects that may inuence the living arrangements of young adults.
3.3.1 Individual characteristics
Our vector of individual characteristics, xmit includes several types of covariates.
These variables include gender, age, and race of the respondents as there are many
gender and racial di¤erences in living arrangements (Goldscheider and DaVanzo, 1985;
Ward and Spitze, 1992; Chiuri and Del Boca, 2010; and Beck and Beck, 1984). In
line with the ndings of these studies, we expect males to be more likely to live with
their parents than females, younger individuals to co-reside with their parents more
than older ones, and Hispanics or African Americans to be more likely to co-reside
with their parents than White Americans. In addition to these standard demographic
variables, we include four more set of variables in the xmit vector.
12See Jackson (2008) for further details.
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The rst set of these additional variables includes parental income and parental
education. As shown in the literature these variables are inuential in the coresidence
behavior of young adults (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993; Goldscheider and Waite,
1991; and White, 1994). Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) show that non coresidents
come from relatively richer and more educated families than coresidents. Hence, we
expect the probability of coresiding with parents to increase with the parental edu-
cation and parental income. Due to the survey design of the AddHealth, this set of
variables comes from Wave I because the parents were interviewed only then.
Another set of additional variables that we control for tries to capture the rela-
tionship of the young adult with her/his parents when she/he was an adolescent. Our
prediction is that if the young adult had a bad relation with the parents or used to do
many household chores when she/he was young, this would make her/him less likely
to continue living with the parents during young adulthood. The variables that we
include are the amount of housework that the respondents used to do in Wave I, and
how good the respondents were considering their relationship with the parents by then.
Furthermore, earlier literature documents that family formation and (un)employment
are key determinants of living arrangements (Iacovou, 2002; Kaplan, 2012). Our last
set of variables tries to capture the e¤ects of these current socioeconomic status of the
young adult, namely the marital status, employment status, and college attainment
(completed or ongoing).13 We expect that the probability of living with parents will
be higher for single, unemployed and young adults with no college attainment.
Finally, we also include state dummies, s that, among others, capture the charac-
teristics of local housing markets that a¤ect the living arrangements of young adults
(Ermisch, 1999; Martínez-Granado and Ruiz-Castillo, 2002; and Martins and Vil-
lanueva, 2009).
3.3.2 Identifying the peer group e¤ects on living with the parents
Individual behavior may move conjointly with average peer group behavior for
three di¤erent reasons. i) Endogenous e¤ects; the behavior of the individual is causally
inuenced by the behavior of the group. This is the peer group e¤ect that we are in-
terested in. ii) Contextual e¤ects; the behavior of the individual is inuenced by
13For the detailed description of variables see Table A.2 in the Appendix.
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the characteristics of the group. iii) Correlated e¤ects; the individual and the group
behave in the same way due to similar environments that are unobserved or due to
endogenous friendship formation/sorting. This arises either from the fact that both
the individual and her friends are subject to common unobserved shocks, due to in-
stitutional environments or because the individual selects friends who are similar to
her.
Manski (1993) shows that identifying the endogenous and the contextual e¤ects
separately in a reduced form linear model is not possible. This is called the reection
problem and it is due to the fact that by denition group behavior is the aggregation of
individual behavior. Solutions that have been proposed in order to solve the reection
problem consist of using instrumental variables techniques, or using panel data (see
Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin, 2009; Boucher et al., 2010). Instruments are used
in order to generate variation in peer behavior that is independent from individual
behavior. Examples of identication strategies with instrumental variables include
Ciliberto et al. (2010) that use the fertility of the siblings of ones colleagues as
an instrument for the fertility of ones colleagues, and Fletscher (2011) that uses the
alcohol consumption of the parents of ones classmates as an instrument for the alcohol
consumption of ones classmates. The basic idea is that siblings or parents of peers
a¤ect the behavior of the peers but have no independent e¤ect on the respondents
behavior. De Giorgi, Pellizzari, and Redaelli (2010), and Pattachini and Zenou (2012)
exploit the information about the whole network of friendships and instrument the
behavior of the respondents friends with the characteristics of friends of friends who
are not directly linked with the respondent.
In our static model, we instrument the percentage of peers living with parents
using the contextual variables which is a common procedure in the literature (e.g.
Gaviria and Raphael, 2001; Powell et al., 2005). We hence assume that there is no
direct e¤ect of friends characteristics on respondents decisions (m = 0) and use
friendscharacteristics as instruments for their living arrangements.14 Then we move
to a dynamic framework and exploit di¤erences in the timing of the move in order to
14In our setting, information on friends of friends is very limited as we need information for both
the respondents and their friends in Wave III. Hence, it is necessary that they have all completed in-
home interviews. As Figure A3 shows in the Appendix, when using in-home nominations, nominated
friends who did not complete in-home interviews were not able to nominate anyone. This is not the
case when we use in-school nominations (Figure A4). However, this information on friends of friends
is irrelevant given that the behavior of friends that we would like to instrument is still missing.
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achieve identication and check the robustness of our results. In this framework the
living arrangements of the friends are already determined at the time that we observe
the behavior of the respondent, and the reection problem is mitigated without the
use of instruments. In order to obtain unbiased estimates we need to assume that the
individuals are not forward looking. They are a¤ected only by the past actions of their
friends.
What about correlated e¤ects? One might worry that people make new friends
as they get older. Hence, it is normal for people who live without their parents to
make new friends who are also similarly behaved. In this case endogeneity would be
a serious problem in identifying the peer e¤ect. In the current analysis we consider
friends since high school. This solves part of the endogenous friendship formation
in later years. Moreover, it is not very likely that adolescents selected friends in
high school according to characteristics that determined their living arrangements
afterwards.15 On the other hand, we also control for Wave I state-level xed e¤ects in
order to overcome the endogeneity of the state of residence in Wave I. In this way we
also control for unobserved state-level characteristics, e.g. welfare policies, mobility
promoting programs, availability of college etc, that could jointly a¤ect the living
arrangements of the respondents and their peers.16
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Static models
Wave I In-Home Nominations.17 We rst examine the determinants of living
arrangements of young adults aged 18-28 using the high school friend nominations.
15The respondents in Wave I were asked whether they wanted to leave parental home. This could
reect either a preference for independence or the fact that the neighborhood was not good. By using
information on whether the parent wanted to change neighborhood we dene as independent children
those who wanted to leave parental home although their parent did not want to change neighborhood.
We do so also for their friends and we then compute the correlation between each childs preference
for independence and peer preference for independence (homophily in terms of independence). The
correlation coe¢ cient is 0.10. This is much smaller than homophily in terms of gender (0.35) or
parental income (0.53).
16Since the nominated friends are not necessarily living in the same block, tract or county, we
control for state xed e¤ects to overcome the problem that may arise due to correlated e¤ects.
17The respondents were asked to nominate their best friends both in the in-school and in the
in-home interview. We present the results using the in-home nominations given that the presence
of other students in the school might have inuenced the in-school nominations of the respondent.
Nevertheless, we also estimated all the specications using the in-school nominations and the results
were very similar.
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Here, we assume that friendships have lasted after high school (i.e. from Wave I to
Wave III for 7-8 years). As explained in the previous section, our dependent variable
takes the value 0 if a young adult who was living with at least one parent when
she/he was adolescent is not living with the parents anymore, and the value 1 if
she/he continues living with at least one parent. The variable of interest is the ratio
of each individuals friends that live with their parents. We include as regressors the
characteristics of the individuals, such as age, gender, race, marital status, employment
status, college attainment, amount of housework used to do in Wave I, how good was
the relationship with the parents, maternal income and education as we discussed
above.
We start with a simple linear probability model (Table 2, column 1) and we nd
a statistically signicant peer e¤ect.18 However, the results of a simple OLS without
xed e¤ects might su¤er from the identication problems that we discussed above. We
therefore perform 2SLS in a linear probability model using the contextual variables as
instruments and including Wave I state xed e¤ects (Table 2, column 2).19 We assume
that the contextual variables do not have any direct e¤ect on individual behavior, i.e.
m = 0 and we exclude them from the regression.20 Instead, we use these contextual
variables as an instrument for the percentage of peers who live with their parents in
Wave III. We omit the contextual variables that are very correlated with individual
characteristics, i.e., those related to race, age and gender. We hence use as instru-
ments the proportion of peers that had a good relationship with their parents, average
housework, parental education and parental income of peers measured at Wave I as
well as the proportion of peers that are single, employed, and completed or attend col-
lege in Wave III. Under the assumption that contextual e¤ects are non-existent, there
should be no direct relationship between individual is behavior and the average back-
ground characteristics of individual is peers. Hence, we expect that the relationship
of individual is peers with their parents when they were adolescents, as well as the
education and income of their parents a¤ect the coresidence behavior of individual is
peers but not the decision of individual i to coreside with his/her parents. Moreover,
18We also calculated marginal e¤ects for a logit estimation as a consistency check. Both the
magnitude and signicance of the coe¢ cients remained unchanged.
19See Table A4 in the Appendix for the results of the full specication.
20Indeed, when we included contextual variables in the OLS regression none of them was statistically
signicant.
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college attainment/attendance and the marital and employment status of the peers of
individual i should determine the decision of the peers to coreside with their parents
but not the decision of individual i directly.
The F statistic of the excluded instruments in the 1st stage is larger than 10
indicating that the instruments are not weak.21 The Hansen J statistic does not reject
the hypothesis of the validity of the instruments. There is a statistically signicant
positive peer e¤ect.
Same grade students living in the same block in Wave I. In this section,
as a robustness check, we dene an alternative group of peers. Given that we study
mobility decisions, dening the peer group of reference using the residential proximity
in Wave I can also be of relevance. Hence, instead of using the friends that the respon-
dents nominated in Wave I we dene the peer group of reference for each respondent as
the students who were enrolled in the same grade (but potentially in di¤erent schools)
and lived in the same block as the respondent in Wave I. This peer group of reference
is a combination of neighbors-grademates and it is particularly relevant in this setting.
Furthermore, dening the peer group of reference in this way allows us to overcome
possible concerns regarding selection and endogenous friendship formation. We per-
form 2SLS using the contextual characteristics as an instrument (Table 3, column 1).
The results of this estimation are comparable with the results presented in Table 2,
column 1.
As Table 3 shows, the peer e¤ect is again positive and signicant. In the last
specication we also add grade xed e¤ects on top of state xed e¤ects in order to
capture unobserved cohort shocks (Table 3, column 2).22 The results are robust.
Discussion of the IV estimates. As we mentioned above, OLS su¤er from the
reection problem. We thus use an instrumental variable approach in order to correct
the upward bias in OLS estimates. However, our 2SLS estimates are larger than the
OLS estimates. One explanation could be that peer-group behaviour was measured
with error and instrumenting for peer behaviour also helped reducing the downward
bias due to those measurement errors. However, since we constructed the peer group
21Table A3 in the Appendix displays the results of the 1st stage regression.
22See Tables A5 and A6 in the Appendix for the results of the 1st stage regression and the results
of the full specication.
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average using the household roster for each peer there is no reason to believe that
there is measurement error in the instrumented variable. Another explanation lies on
the nature of our instruments. Other studies that use contextual variables in order
to instrument peer group behavior also nd larger estimates in the 2SLS specication
(Gaviria and Rafael,2001; Lundborg,2006; Fletscher, 2011). It is not clear that the
contextual characteristics are legitimate instrumental variables for peer behavior, even
if they have no independent causal e¤ect on individual behavior. This is why we move
to a dynamic specication where we mitigate the reection problem using the time
dimension instead of instrumental variables.
3.4.2 Some dynamics
In Wave III the respondents were also asked to ll in a calendar of geographical
mobility with all the states they have lived in and the month and year of the move.
This calendar contains information about all the states that the respondent has lived in
during his life, the year and month of the move to each state and to the current address.
However, there is no information on other coresiding members (parents, partners or
friends) so as to know whether the respondent moved together with the parents or
no. In order to make use of the dynamic component of the data we assume for those
respondents who were not living with the parents in Wave III that the date they
moved out of the parental home for the rst time coincides with the date of the move
to the current address. In other words, we assume for the respondents who changed
residence between Wave II and the date of the move to the current address that parents
were also moving with them. Only the last move to the current address corresponds
to individuals moving out alone. Actually, 71.51% of the respondents moved to the
current address in the last 3 years, i.e. between 1999 and 2001, when they were on
average 20.75 years old. This is very similar to the age by which 50% of young adults
have left parental home in the U.S. (Iacovou, 2002). Hence, our assumption is likely
to hold.23
In this framework we can exploit di¤erences in the timing of the move in order to
achieve identication. In particular, using information on the month and year that
people moved to the current address, we treat as non-coresidents only the friends that
23Figure A5 in the Appendix depicts the details of our assumption.
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moved out of the parental home before the respondent. We thus treat the friends that
left the parental home after the respondent as coresidents with their parents. The fact
that these friends left the parental home after the respondent suggests that they were
still living with the parents at the time the respondent moved out of the parental home.
Hence friends can be either coresidents (never moved out of the parental home or did
so after the respondent) or non coresidents (moved out of the parental home before the
respondent). In this way, the living arrangements of the friends are already determined
at the time that we observe the behavior of the respondent, and the reection problem
is mitigated without the use of instruments.
Table 4, column 1 presents the results of the OLS regression of this dynamic model,
which are also in line with the estimates of the static model.24 ;25 In particular, the
estimated coe¢ cient of the peer e¤ect is statistically signicant and equal to 0.076.
How large is the estimated e¤ect? In our sample the mean of the variable of interest
(% of friends that still live with their parents) is 0.65 with a standard deviation of 0.44.
According to our estimates an increase of one standard deviation in the percentage of
friends that still live with their parents will increase the individual probability of living
with the parents by 3.3 percentage points. This increase in peer behavior represents an
increase in individual behavior of about 6.8 percent of its standard deviation (which
is 0.49). This e¤ect is not negligible.
3.4.3 Heterogeneous e¤ects
But who are the ones who are inuenced by their peers? Is there a group of
individuals that is totally una¤ected? In order to answer this question we analyze
separately di¤erent groups of individuals with respect to gender and parental income.
Table 5 presents the results of the dynamic model by gender. The peer e¤ect on
girls is large and statistically signicant. The peer e¤ect on boys, although similar in
magnitude to the one on girls, is not statistically signicant. This is probably due to
the splitting of the sample. Therefore, there is no strong evidence that peers inuence
the living arrangements of girls more than the living arrangements of boys or vice
versa. The picture is much more clear in the case of parental income though. We run
24See Table A7 in the Appendix for the results of the full specication.
25We also estimated the dynamic model including school xed e¤ects and the peer e¤ect remained
signicant at 10% percent level but decreased a bit in magnitude (0.051).
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the dynamic model separately for young adults coming from relatively wealthy families
(parental income above the median) and for young adults coming from relatively poor
families (parental income below the median). There is a very large peer e¤ect only on
young adults that come from relatively wealthy families (Table 6). By contrast, the
living arrangements of young adults coming from relatively poor families are completely
una¤ected by peers. This result might reect the fact that one can actually move out
of the parental home only if there are enough nancial resources.
3.5 Conclusions
Decreased geographical mobility of young adults can have several consequences on
unemployment and growth. We study the recent increase in the percentage of young
adults living with their parents in the U.S. which might be associated with the decrease
in their mobility. We use data on high school friends and we make use of instruments
and state xed e¤ects in order to mitigate the problems of identication. We nd that
peers play an important role in determining the living arrangements of young adults
in the U.S. In particular, an increase of one standard deviation in the percentage of
friends that still live with their parents will lead to an increase of 3.3 percentage points
in the individual probability of living with the parents. Policy makers should take this
peer e¤ect into account when evaluating policies that are intended to boost youth
emancipation or mobility.
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3.6 Tables
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics by Coresidence with Parents
Characteristic Non Coresidents Coresidents All
% females 55.24 47.92 52.24
% White 79.19 70.88 75.79
% African-American 10.85 12.33 11.46
% Hispanic 6.97 10.89 11.94
Wave III variables
Mean Age 21.86 21.03 21.52
(1.78) (1.72) (1.80)
% single 56.32 89.53 69.93
% with college education 68.03 64.04 66.39
% employed 74.18 73.58 73.94
Wave I variables
% good relationship with a parent in Wave I 79.07 84.62 81.35
Mean amount of housework in Wave I 2.14 2.02 2.09
(4-scale category) (0.85) (0.88) (0.86)
Mean parental income in Wave I 52.26 47.05 50.10
(thousand dollars) (51.76) (35.05) (45.65)
Mean parental education 1.77 1.65 1.72
(4-scale category) (0.99) (0.99) (0.99)
% 59.02 40.98 100.00
Number of obs. 2,266 1,683 3,949
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. The sample includes young adults who were living with at least one
parent in Wave I, with non missing own and high school friendscoresidence information.
Corrected for the design e¤ects of the Add Health sampling process.
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Table 2. Determinants of living arrangements in Wave III, static model
Denition of Peers Nominated friends Nominated friends
(1) (2)
Specication OLS 2SLS
% peers living with parents 0.062** 0.152*
(0.029) (0.084)
Individual char. Yes Yes
Parental char. Yes Yes
Contextual char. No Used as instruments
Wave I State xed e¤. No Yes
No of observations 2,792 2,358
R2 0.229 0.161
F-statistic 1st stage - 37.95
J statistic p-value - 0.284
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (robust s.e. clustered at school level), cross sectional weight used
Control variables: age, gender, race, marital status, employment status, college attainment, amount
of housework used to do in Wave I, how good was the relationship with the parents in Wave I,
maternal income and education
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Table 3. Determinants of living arrangements in Wave III, di¤erent peer group
Denition of Peers Students from the same grade
who lived at the same block in Wave I
(1) (2)
Specication 2SLS 2SLS
% peers living with parents 0.184* 0.204**
(0.097) (0.102)
Individual char. Yes Yes
Parental char. Yes Yes
Contextual char. Used as instruments Used as instruments
Wave I State xed e¤. Yes Yes
Wave I Grade xed e¤. No Yes
No of observations 2,960 2,960
R2 0.210 0.178
F-statistic 1st stage 27.17 24.11
J statistic p-value 0.343 0.439
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (robust s.e. clustered at school level), cross sectional weight used
Control variables: age, gender, race, marital status, employment status, college attainment, amount
of housework used to do in Wave I, how good was the relationship with the parents in Wave I,
maternal income and education
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Table 4. Determinants of living arrangements in Wave III, dynamic model
Denition of Peers Nominated friends
(1)
Specication OLS
% peers living with parents 0.076***
(0.026)
Individual char. Yes
Parental char. Yes
Contextual char. No
Wave I State xed e¤. Yes
No of observations 2,792
R2 0.236
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (robust s.e. clustered at school level), cross sectional weight used
Control variables: age, gender, race, marital status, employment status, college attainment, amount
of housework used to do in Wave I, how good was the relationship with the parents in Wave I,
maternal income and education
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Table 5. Determinants of living arrangements in Wave III, dynamic model by gender
Denition of Peers Nominated friends Nominated friends
(1) (2)
Females Males
Specication OLS OLS
% peers living with parents 0.076** 0.064
(0.030) (0.042)
Individual char. Yes Yes
Parental char. Yes Yes
Contextual char. No No
Wave I State xed e¤. Yes Yes
No of observations 1,474 1,318
R2 0.247 0.260
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (robust s.e. clustered at school level), cross sectional weight used
Control variables: age, gender, race, marital status, employment status, college attainment, amount
of housework used to do in Wave I, how good was the relationship with the parents in Wave I,
maternal income and education
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Table 6. Determinants of living arrangements in Wave III, dynamic model by parental income
Denition of Peers Nominated friends Nominated friends
(1) (2)
Wealthy parents Poor parents
Specication OLS OLS
% peers living with parents 0.126*** 0.014
(0.036) (0.038)
Individual char. Yes Yes
Parental char. Yes Yes
Contextual char. No No
Wave I State xed e¤. Yes Yes
No of observations 1,392 1,400
R2 0.241 0.301
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (robust s.e. clustered at school level), cross sectional weight used
Control variables: age, gender, race, marital status, employment status, college attainment, amount
of housework used to do in Wave I, how good was the relationship with the parents in Wave I,
maternal income and education
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3.7 Appendix
Figure A1. Percentage of movers26by age group, 1999-2011
Figure A2. Percentage of movers aged 18-29, by gender, 1999-2011
26The population is classied according to mobility status by the U.S. Census Bureau on the basis
of a comparison between the place of residence of each individual to the time of the March survey
and the place of residence one year earlier. All people who were living in a di¤erent house at the end
of the period rather than at the beginning are classied as movers.
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Figure A3. In-home nominations and in-home interviews
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Figure A4. In-school nominations and in-home interviews
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Figure A5. Assumption for the dynamic model
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Table A.1. Descriptive Statistics, Full Sample
Characteristic All
% females 49.21
% White 68.01
% African-American 15.88
% Hispanic 11.94
Wave III variables
Mean Age 21.82
(1.87)
% single 66.76
% with college education 57.35
% employed 74.36
Wave I variables
% good relationship with a parent in Wave I 80.16
Mean amount of housework in Wave I 2.04
(4-scale category) (0.89)
Mean parental income in Wave I 45.74
(thousand dollars) (45.17)
Mean parental education 1.58
(4-scale category) (1.01)
%
Number of obs. 14322
Notes: Standard errors in paranthesis. Sample based on Wave III of Add Health.
Corrected for the design e¤ects of the Add Health sampling process.
The target population for this sample is comprised of young adults in 2001, who were
enrolled in US schools during the 1994-1995 academic year for the specied grades.
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Table A2. Denition of Variables
Variable Type Values
Gender binary
8<: 0 if male1 if female
Age continuous [18, 28]
Hispanic binary
8<: 0 if not Hispanic1 if Hispanic
African American binary
8<: 0 if not African American1 if African American
Single binary
8<: 0 if married or cohabiting1 if single
College binary
8<: 0 if no college1 if completed college or currently in college
Employed binary
8<: 0 if not employed1 if employed
Well with parent in Wave I binary
8<: 0 if bad relationship with both parents in wave I1 if good relationship with one parent in wave I
Housework in Wave I ordinal
8>>>>><>>>>>:
0 not at all
1 1 or 2 times per week
2 2 or 3 times per week
3 5 or more times per week
Total household income in Wave I continuous in thousand $
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Parental education ordinal
8>>>>><>>>>>:
0 Less than highschool
1 Highschool or similar
2 More than highschool
3 College or more
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Table A3. IV-Auxilliary Equation-Nominated friends
Instrumented: % peers living with parents
Coe¢ cient Std. Error
Gender 0.011 (0.021)
Age -0.037*** (0.007)
African American 0.023 (0.059)
Hispanic 0.054 (0.052)
Other race 0.135* (0.078)
Single -0.015 (0.050)
Employed 0.022 (0.041)
Single*employed 0.009 (0.056)
College -0.019 (0.027)
Housework -0.001 (0.012)
Well with parent 0.019 (0.027)
Parental Education -0.026* (0.014)
Parental Income 0.0001 (0.0002)
% single peers 0.396*** (0.028)
% employed peers 0.100*** (0.035)
% peers with college education -0.123*** (0.037)
% peers well with their parent 0.044 (0.040)
average housework of peers -0.024 (0.018)
average parental education of peers -0.016 (0.015)
average parental income of peers -0.0004 (0.0004)
No of observations 2,358
R2 0.199
*** p<0.001, **p<0.05, *p<0.10, rob s.e. clustered at school level
Cross sectional weights used
F test of excluded instruments: F(7,128)=37.95, Prob>F=0.000
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Table A4. Full Specication (2nd Stage)-Nominated friends
Coe¢ cient Std. Error
% peers living with parents 0.152* (0.084)
Gender -0.005 (0.029)
Age -0.029** (0.011)
African American -0.009 (0.059)
Hispanic 0.040 (0.035)
Other race 0.139** (0.058)
Single 0.222*** (0.057)
Employed -0.118** (0.054)
Single*employed 0.170*** (0.062)
College -0.086*** (0.029)
Housework -0.042** (0.016)
Well with parent 0.048 (0.029)
Parental Education -0.014 (0.014)
Parental Income -0.0003 (0.0003)
No of observations 2,358
R2 0.161
*** p<0.001, **p<0.05, *p<0.10, robust s.e. clustered at school level
Cross sectional weights used
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Table A5. IV-Auxilliary Equation-Di¤erent peer group
Instrumented: % peers living with parents
Coe¢ cient Std. Error
Gender 0.005 (0.010)
Age -0.007 (0.007)
African American -0.023 (0.031)
Hispanic -0.021 (0.028)
Other race -0.023 (0.039)
Single 0.010 (0.022)
Employed 0.003 (0.018)
Single*employed 0.012 (0.024)
College -0.008 (0.011)
Housework 0.003 (0.006)
Well with parent -0.019* (0.011)
Parental Education -0.001 (0.005)
Parental Income -0.000 (0.000)
% single peers 0.472*** (0.044)
% employed peers 0.068 (0.047)
% peers with college education -0.077 (0.050)
% peers well with their parent -0.015 (0.045)
average housework of peers -0.022 (0.024)
average parental education of peers -0.049*** (0.020)
average parental income of peers -0.000 (0.000)
No of observations 2,960
R2 0.175
*** p<0.001, **p<0.05, *p<0.10, rob s.e. clustered at school level
Cross sectional weights used
F test of excluded instruments: F(7,95)=24.11, Prob>F=0.000
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Table A6. Full Specication (2nd Stage)-Di¤erent peer group
Coe¢ cient Std. Error
% peers living with parents 0.204** (0.101)
Gender -0.027 (0.034)
Age -0.063*** (0.021)
African American 0.035 (0.046)
Hispanic 0.032 (0.044)
Other race 0.020 (0.068)
Single 0.278*** (0.054)
Employed -0.128** (0.055)
Single*employed 0.190*** (0.063)
College -0.082*** (0.024)
Housework -0.036*** (0.013)
Well with parent 0.009 (0.037)
Parental Education -0.037*** (0.012)
Parental Income -0.0004** (0.0002)
No of observations 2,960
R2 0.178
*** p<0.001, **p<0.05, *p<0.10, robust s.e. clustered at school level
Cross sectional weights used
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Table A7. Full Specication (Dynamic model)-Nominated friends
Coe¢ cient Std. Error
% peers living with parents 0.076*** (0.026)
Gender -0.024 (0.029)
Age -0.040*** (0.009)
African American 0.031 (0.055)
Hispanic 0.043 (0.037)
Other race 0.141*** (0.053)
Single 0.240*** (0.057)
Employed -0.012** (0.051)
Single*employed 0.152** (0.063)
College -0.083*** (0.025)
Housework -0.042*** (0.015)
Well with parent 0.047* (0.027)
Parental Education -0.020 (0.012)
Parental Income -0.0004* (0.0002)
No of observations 2,792
R2 0.231
*** p<0.001, **p<0.05, *p<0.10, robust s.e. clustered at school level
Cross sectional weights used
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